dealing with attrition

[FartingLesbianSwoopingCraneXXIII]

can someone explain to me how attrition works. I am suffering attrition even though i have armies within supply depot range with adequate supply through put to my army. i have recently won a battle so could that play a factor? does the actual size of the army affect this? how do i improve my logistical system to cut down on attrition for my larger armies. than you for all yalls help and advice.

[Wolfpack]

Well idk for sure, but an ingame experience and simple logic shows that:
A. Big armies suffer more attrition. Its harder to maintain them, the percentage of deserters and sick increases as well.
B. Supply lines. Pushing too deep into enemy territory will cut your army off from the supply lines of your nation. In order to prevent that, make sure you build supply depots during your campaign, make sure the supply lines are controled by loyal authorities, and most important: dont push to deep and too fast into enemy territory. This game is meant to be played slowly.
C. Stay along main roads and railways. Diving into the wilderness (mosty on the Western theatre) will cause a cut down of the resupply of your army.
D. Constant retreat in panic and constant defeat will cause desertion and rearguard losses. Avoid such scenarios, choose your battles wisely.
E. Low morale units and expired contracts increase the percentege of attrition, and overall chances to be defeated

[Zipuli]

A few points about attrition & supplies:

There will always be attrition within your units. Attrition increases when supplies are low, morale is low, condition is low (due to hard forced marching, for example), or weather is poor (winter, rain are the worst). Commanders with good leadership and administration abilities will decrease effects of attrition.

Most of the time attrition is about morale or supplies. Morale will be hit in combat, so in Sloppy's case it could be due to recent combat. During battles supplies are also consumed faster than when outside of combat, and logistics will have more issues delivering all supplies (ammunition, etc.).

Supplies are stored in depots. Supplies can be drawn directly from depots when the depot is within command range of the unit in question. Depots themselves connect to, and receive supplies from the economy via infrastructure points (IIPs) like towns, harbors... These IIPs can carry only a limited amount of goods (military supplies & other), depending on type and condition. Railroads are the most effective. If there is no supply depot within command range, the unit in question will draw supplies from the local IIPs (incl. foraging). This is quite OK for smaller units, but larger armies cannot be supplied without depots for a long period of time.

All this combined means that supply depots can only support a limited number of troops, and the effectiveness depends on transportation capacity & availability of supplies as well. Even a large supply depot that cannot be reached via railroad will not be able to refill itself faster than connected units will consume supplies.

When pushing into enemy territory, the issue will become more serious, as capturing IIPs will cause their transportation capacity to drop momentarily. The capacity will again increase, but over time.

In next version we will show a bit more information about resupplying of units via depots. Hopefully it will help understanding the system a bit better.

[HB]

Originally posted by Zipuli:

Most of the time attrition is about morale or supplies. Morale will be hit in combat, so in Sloppy's case it could be due to recent combat. During battles supplies are also consumed faster than when outside of combat, and logistics will have more issues delivering all supplies (ammunition, etc.).

This is not how WBTS logistics operated, the extra weight of munitions from combat was under aminimal increase*, and the in game causes of attrition in game do not match historical causality

*Gettysburg saw 250 tons of munitions expended by both sides over 3 days.

Food/water /fodder otoh, was 5235 tons, so munitions was 5% by weight.

Originally posted by Zipuli:

Supplies are stored in depots. Supplies can be drawn directly from depots when the depot is within command range of the unit in question. Depots themselves connect to, and receive supplies from the economy via infrastructure points (IIPs) like towns, harbors... These IIPs can carry only a limited amount of goods (military supplies & other), depending on type and condition. Railroads are the most effective.

Wrong river transport was the most effective, it was cheaper to operate and delivered more ton/miles for less finacial cost and was less prone to being intercepted, then came rail road, which was also inferior to local forage in terms of weight procured over time.

Originally posted by Zipuli:

If there is no supply depot within command range, the unit in question will draw supplies from the local IIPs (incl. foraging). This is quite OK for smaller units, but larger armies cannot be supplied without depots for a long period of time.

Except living of ther land, by forage, was exactly how large armies functioned for many months at a time, throughout the war.

Originally posted by Zipuli:

All this combined means that supply depots can only support a limited number of troops, and the effectiveness depends on transportation capacity & availability of supplies as well. Even a large supply depot that cannot be reached via railroad will not be able to refill itself faster than connected units will consume supplies.

What it also means is the game as a 20th century logistics depot based model system, and is forcing players to use stratagies on that model. Wagons are not even in game and none of the depots can function without the use of wagons and Armies did not use a supply from depot as its used in game.

Originally posted by Zipuli:

In next version we will show a bit more information about resupplying of units via depots. Hopefully it will help understanding the system a bit better.

Most people already understand its just another game system designed to fail at what it is portraying.

Army is 100 miles from a depot in game.
Army has 80,000 men.

3lbs ration weight a day per man, 240000so for this depot to supply the daily requirement means 110 wagons at full capacity on good roads with no incline each day to deliver it, and they then move at 3mph for 8 hours in a day, so therfore there are 880 wagons in use each day to do this. What feeds them while they are doing it?, thats 5280 animals eating 105600 lbs a day, so they either eat half what they are carrying, and you need expotentialy more wagons, or where is that food coming from?.

[HB]

Originally posted by Zipuli:

Supplies are stored in depots. Supplies can be drawn directly from depots when the depot is within command range of the unit in question.

Why the command range? which is 00s of miles, surely its the practical range of wagons from the depot that determines the supply rate, further you go the more wagons you need and soon there are no more wagons avaiable and each delivering less and less.20 miles from a depot and the wagon can do a round trip and ressupply itself back at the depot and deliver its full forward lift. 2 days away , 40 miles or so, and its forward lift is reduced by 4 days consumption to resupply itself back at dept, so its lost around 20% of payload. 3 days, 25% lost and so on.

Originally posted by Zipuli:

Depots themselves connect to, and receive supplies from the economy via infrastructure points (IIPs) like towns, harbors... These IIPs can carry only a limited amount of goods (military supplies & other), depending on type and condition. Railroads are the most effective. If there is no supply depot within command range, the unit in question will draw supplies from the local IIPs (incl. foraging). This is quite OK for smaller units, but larger armies cannot be supplied without depots for a long period of time.

No this is simply wrong. Huge armies lived only of the land for many months. Entire USA war aim to to be able to logistically support an invasion of the South, which meant control of rivers, so as to gain the ports on them, that then allowed Armies to march inland from base of supplies based on ports as ports were the most effective way to supply. On the coast this was the same concept, the problem was the South was not a rail road economy, the RR linked production of output to ports as they were all privatly built to serve that function.
In 1864 the US QM dept was employing 750 steamers average forward lift 250 ton, and 1100 shallow draft inland vesseles 150 tons average forward lift. 352500 tons capacity, 775500000lbs, or 800lbs a day per member of the US Army. By contrast the entire RR could deliver 125 lbs a day per member. So, 550000 lbs per steamer. A RR Loco with typicaly 10 box cars was 200,000lbs, which means a single steamer is doing the job of 3 such trains with barges contributing 1.7. So water borne was 4.7 times more ton miles better than a RR system. Or rather the water borne traffic was the equivalent of 4100 train loads a day, which the US had no such capacity to perform by RR. Each train requiring 75 wagons to move its cargo weight from the train each port requiring 352 wagons.

[A_P_Hill]

Attrition is attributable to bad leaders as well. Not just living conditions. So if during an incident in the campaign you see a message that a certain leader in your armies fell into disrepute, after the fight enter your OOB and clean the guy out.

[HB]

Originally posted by Zipuli:

A few points about attrition & supplies:

In next version we will show a bit more information about resupplying of units via depots. Hopefully it will help understanding the system a bit better.

June 1862 J Pop assumes command of the Army of Virginia, c70k at peak more often 50k, and was removed from command in Sept, he was hard war Republican*, who did not use any depot system ( except munitions) to sustain his Army, so by his orders his Army lived only of the land for 4 months, fighting the following Battles at the end of the 4 months, Cedar Run, 2nd Bull Run, Chantilly.

In General Orders, nos. 5 and 6, Pope ordered, “the troops of this command will subsist upon the country in which their operations are carried on.” “no supply or baggage trains of any description will be used unless so stated specifically in the order for the movement.” The army would rely almost exclusively on local food sources for both the men and horses"

* Pope was hand picked by the radicals to prosecute the hard war policy they advocated, and would use extensivly by late war Republican Generals, who changed the law to make living of the land and not paying for doing so unless you took the loyalty oath, lawful, which was a capital crime under existing Articles of war which soft war Democrat's and the US fought the war under.

[mogami_99]

pretty sure a lot of Popes men went hungry and at 2nd Bull Run his cavalry was wore out and almost no use at all. Horses in cavalry or artillery break down in only a few days if not properly fed and maintained.
Jackson burned his depots
Lack of forage is part of the reason ANV was so spread out in 1863 with Longstreet absent from Chancellersville (only 2 divisions of I corps were present) He was away recuperating his horses.
I believe ANV went to PA not to seek a decisive battle but to gather supplies (In 1868 Lee wrote he was not looking for a battle in Pa) Look at the amount of livestock and material he brought back to Va after. So an army can subsist off of the surrounding land provided it has not been visited prior.
His final AAR January 1864 lists the 5 reasons he entered Pa
To draw the Union Army of the Potomac away from the Rappahannock River line.
To take the initiative away from the enemy and disrupt any defensive plan General Joseph Hooker might have had for the rest of the summer.
To drive Union occupation forces out of Winchester and the lower Shenandoah Valley.
To draw Union forces away from other theaters to reinforce Hooker.
To take the armies out of war-ravaged Virginia and to provide the Army of Northern Virginia with food, forage, horses, and other supplies from the rich agricultural countryside of Pennsylvania.
He stated he wished to avoid any battle.
ANV was supplied for months after by supplies brought back.
So my conclusions about supply off the land are both yes and no. Yes while they last but are not unlimited and No if the region has been occupied for any amount of time. And depending on time of year. Part of the reason you don't campaign in winter but encamp near your depots. Gathering supplies off the land should replenish depots as well.
An army that begins movement in range of a depot should at least carry a weeks rations. Running out of supply 20 miles from start should not happen. Of course quite often soldiers were ordered to cook 3 days rations but then ate them in 1 day.
ramble ramble

[HB]

Originally posted by mogami_99:

pretty sure a lot of Popes men went hungry and at 2nd Bull Run his cavalry was wore out and almost no use at all. Horses in cavalry or artillery break down in only a few days if not properly fed and maintained.

US lacked enough cav in 62, once all the jobs they have to do are done, there simply was not enough to do much with what is left.

Jackson burned what Pope was not using to live off.

Pope assigned 5 Regiments to each Corps 2nd Bull Run campaign, .This made up 174 cav coys, 70 were attached to HQs to perform recon/escort/forage etc, 24 were broken down, this just means more men than horses and awaiting re mounts, and in general reserve and not used, Buford took 44 deep to the r flank on a raid, and Bayard 24 to cover the L Flank. That leaves 12 coys for tactical battlefield use.

At the same time Mac had 113 Coys of cav, but only had 10 attached to HQ, ie a third less than Pope, as he is not living of the land and escourting wagons of plunder.He also has to assign 19 coys to protect his lone of supply, Pope used none as he none to protect.He kept 25 as fighting units, so with less cav he had twice the cav combat units.

By 63, the AoP had over twice the number of Cav coys, it still has to do all the recon/escort etc roles the cav exist to perform, but now it has 00s of coys to use in any battle.

[mogami_99]

Pope was the first Union general to put his cav into Brigades. Bufords raid is the reason his brigade was wore out. Buford was one of the few Union generals that came out the campaign reputation enhanced because while he only used 2 of the regiments his brigade was the first to give the confederate cav a fight. Although he eventually had to retreat his first charge put a hurt on a reb regiment. I wonder if he had employed all 4 regt. (The last two got caught in the retreat of the first 2) But in the end his brigade was not available later when he might have been handy.

[HB]

Originally posted by mogami_99:

Pope was the first Union general to put his cav into Brigades.

Depends what you think that means, Pope put his Art and cav into Brigades according to War dept instructions to do so, this was for logistical simplicity, and not to create independent commands, each of those Brigades subject to the Infantry formation they were assigned to. My guess is you read that in E Wittenburgs book, he does not know what it means either.

Originally posted by mogami_99:

Bufords raid is the reason his brigade was wore out. But in the end his brigade was not available later when he might have been handy.

Depends what you think wore out means, and not available means, given his Brigade was sent to Throughfare gap on teh 26th to prevent/find L/street moving to help Jackson, failed and reported to McDowel L/street was moving towards TJ, Mcdowel on the morning of the 29th, who did not pass this intel onwards, and was back with Pope Army on the same day for the battle and committed to cover the retreat.

https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/civil_war_series/18/sec7.htm

Lewis Ford, besides being one of the largest cavalry conflicts up to that time, had two other important repercussions. First, General Buford managed to withstand and delay the enemy long enough to save the Union army. Had Buford not been there and stood up to the Rebels, Pope and his entire army would have been lost. As Buford charged, a new and valuable player entered the war. Union cavalry had never initiated a stand-up fight until this time. From this point on, the cavalry of the Union was going to make its presence on the battlefield known. The encounter at Lewis Ford saved an army and demonstrated how Federal cavalry in the Civil War was beginning to develop.

Originally posted by mogami_99:

Buford was one of the few Union generals that came out the campaign reputation enhanced because while he only used 2 of the regiments his brigade was the first to give the confederate cav a fight.

Buford was getting good at outposting and recon to be sure, sadly non one was acting correctly on what he was providing, Porter being sent in by Pope with Porter knowing his flank was threatened by L/Street and Pope refusing to accept that intel.

Not clear why you think Buford used 2 formations, when his and other reports refer to the use of 4. Buford was aided by Beardsley 4th NY Regiment, so it was Bufords 3 Regiments plus the NY that charged, in columns, with sabres and drove in the CS, a mixed Inf Cav and Art force, who reformed and sent Bufords command, reeling back, see 4th NY after action report.

[HB]

Originally posted by mogami_99:

His final AAR January 1864 lists the 5 reasons he entered Pa
To draw the Union Army of the Potomac away from the Rappahannock River line.
To take the initiative away from the enemy and disrupt any defensive plan General Joseph Hooker might have had for the rest of the summer.
To drive Union occupation forces out of Winchester and the lower Shenandoah Valley.
To draw Union forces away from other theaters to reinforce Hooker.
To take the armies out of war-ravaged Virginia and to provide the Army of Northern Virginia with food, forage, horses, and other supplies from the rich agricultural countryside of Pennsylvania.
He stated he wished to avoid any battle.

http://explorepahistory.com/odocument.php?docId=1-4-F4

Now compare to Coddington A Study in command, https://www.amazon.co.uk/Gettysburg-Campaign-Study-Command/dp/0684845695 for the planning of the campaign.

In May at a Richmond planning conference, Page 8 on Lees intention to invade PA and strike a blow North of the Potomac where it would have the greater impact, and had a map drawn up as far as Harrisonburg/Philidephia. Page 9 Long, Lees ADC recalls lee predicting to have give battle around Gettysburg Chambersburg york area so as to be able to retire through the passes if defeated, and that big cities were not a military objecvtive, the AoP was. Which if heavily defeated would strengthen soft war democrates, might effect events in the west. Marshal recounts the same, if a major succes was achieved North of the Potomac, both Richmond and Vicksburg were saved for a period.

Some more in coddington
"The Cumberland Valley in Maryland and Pennsylvania was so rich in agricultural produce that by June 23, within a week after the first units of Ewell's corps had crossed the Potomac, they had accumulated enough supplies to feed all of his corps until June 30, as well as 1,700 barrels of flour for the rest of the army".

1700 barrels of flour is 333200lbs of flour, (a llb loaf of bread requires 300 grams of flour)at 450 grams a pound that 499,800 1 lb loaves of bread. Half a million daily rations worth, 5 days worth for a 100k men, this is another example of the ease in which you can live of the land, depending on population density, far easier than being supplied from depot.

Then we have what lee said other leading up to the battle
to trimble 27 june.

"We have again out-manoevered the enemy, who even now don't know where we are or what are our designs. Our whole army will be in Pennsylvania the day after tomorrow, leaving the enemy far behind and obliged to follow up by forced marches. I hope with the advantages to accomplish some signal result and to end the war if Providence favors us."

"Our army is in good spirits, not fatigued and can be concentrated on any one point in twentyfour hours or less. I have not yet heard that the enemy have crossed the Potomac, and am waiting to hear from General Stuart. When they hear where we are they will make forced marches to interpose their forces between us and Baltimore and Philadelphia. They will come up, probably through Frederick, broken down and with hunger and hard marching, strung out on a long line and much demoralised, when they come into Pennsylvania. I shall throw an overwhelming force on their advance, crush it, follow up the success, drive one corps back on another, and by successive repulses and surprises." At the conclusion of our interview, he laid his hands on the map over Gettysburg and said "hereabout we shall probably meet the enemy and fight a great battle, and if God gives us a victory, the war will be over and we shall achieve the recognition of our Independence"

[HB]

Originally posted by mogami_99:

and at 2nd Bull Run his cavalry was wore out and almost no use at all. Horses in cavalry or artillery break down in only a few days if not properly fed and maintained.

US made horses unservicable at a rate almost three times that of the south, in the first two
two years for 60,000 cavalrymen were issued 284,000 horses in the union. So Pope cav were breaking down around half the national average.

[HB]

Originally posted by mogami_99:

An army that begins movement in range of a depot should at least carry a weeks rations. Running out of supply 20 miles from start should not happen. Of course quite often soldiers were ordered to cook 3 days rations but then ate them in 1 day.
ramble ramble

Grant's army in 1864 was about 142,000 men PFD when it crossed the Rapidan, and it had 4,300 wagons with it; this got his army over the Rapidan and keep them supplied until they reached Port Royal, 60 miles away, giving them the ability to operate out of supply for sixteen days.

In game you get far less, its all to do with the number of wagons ratio to consumption, ANV if it had 4300 wagons for Gettysburg could exist for 24 days from what it carried with it.

[HB]

Originally posted by mogami_99:

Lack of forage is part of the reason ANV was so spread out in 1863 with Longstreet absent from Chancellersville (only 2 divisions of I corps were present) He was away recuperating his horses.

Lee sent l/Streets Corps away, with its 3 regiments of cav in a small brigade and stuarts cav Div into Loudan valley both to live of the land as the ANV was down to 8 days supply, while sitting at its dept, ie the depot system was unable to supply the whole ANV, fodder is low in weight but high in volume so there was not enough space in the trains to get the fodder volume required, a problem with all RR supply inc German in ww2 ) so l/street/stuart moved to gather supplies where they existed but could not be transported to the ANV.

[Wagonmaker]

you can also upgrade your supply depots. click on them then hit upgrade at the top of the depot's UI box.