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The real hero of Shiloh was Everett Peabody who defied orders and sent pickets to uncover the Souths surprise attack without him i truly believe Grant might have taken a beating he could not recover from and then who knows what would have happened to him.
Grants luck held on day 1 along with some dogged defending and its testament to Grant that he turned it around.
However do remember the South had lost its commander was very poorly armed and after the first day cohesion had broken down in virtually every brigade they had given everything day 1 and were basically done.
You could debate that all those other battles might not have happened if Grant was in charge who knows.
Their is a good ling here that describes and debates Peabody's contribution
https://civilwartalk.com/threads/did-everett-peabody-save-the-union-army-from-disaster-at-shiloh.138669/
This had more to do with generals ignoring Johnston's orders and Davis arguably then Gran'ts brilliance. Basically the CSA in the west beat themselves.
I think Grant benefitted a lot from being at the right place at the right time. He wasn't terrible general, but I wouldn't put him in the Great category.
If anything you can give him high remarks for being a soldier. His commander, aka Lincoln, said he was to fight, so he obeyed and fought.
Some of Grants own remarks I think were favorable to McClellan. But McClellan spent to much time politicting.
Even in today's world, sometimes there are bosses you can't and shouldn't reason with, it's not to reason why, it's to do and die.
Grant also benefited in having a competent if not great Strategic general like Sherman operating in the west. They were at the worse on the same page arguably, having a like mind on what needed to get done.
The question is would they have done a Peninsula Campaign? That kicked off a bunch chained events. I don't know if swapping out McClellan with Grant changes the chain if you do a peninsula campaign. It actually might cause the CSA to be even more aggressive and try and pin the Union army against the river/sea. I don't think grant would have done a Peninsula though that early in the war, so from that perspective I think you would have gotten more of an end of the war result in the east, earlier.
I'd argue against the "he's not one to be caught by surprise" He got lucky on several occassions, but like you said, he the situation didn't seem to overwhelm him. He seemed like he was able to adjust tactics as the situation arised, even if it wasn't of the highest efficiency.
Except this is a myth started by Peaboys nephew in his bio, that he defied orders, and gives his uncle the credit of another, when Powel opens fire on the Miss regiment, its Johnstone who hears it and says the battle has begun etc, hours before Peabody does anything. He was following his superiors orders. The orders to Peabody who is sent to reinforce the existing picket line under Powel, with 3 coys and 2 coys of a different regiment peabody had no authority over and were sent by Prentis with Powel read, “drive in the guard and open up on the reserve, develop the force, hold the ground as long as possible, then fall back.”
Why not Major Powell or Robert Medkirk of the 72nd Ohio?, or any others in the picket line.
US Army uses shiloh https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll2/id/3065/ as an example of "Among the more important conclusions of the thesis are: 1. Although the Union forces below division level anticipated the Confederate attack. Grant and his command echelon were completely surprised. 2. Surprise was achieved because the Union had violated several principles of war, chiefly: objective, offensive, maneuver, unity of command, and security."
Robert Medkirk of the 72nd Ohio concerning the skirmish his regiment had with Confederates on April 4th, 2 days before the battlehttps://ehistory.osu.edu/books/battles/vol1/537 Sherman's report of this incident to Grant, written on the 5th, says "I infer that the enemy is in some considerable force at Pea Ridge", which is about 8 miles from Shiloh, yet Sherman was suprised in spite of that knowledge.
Powel and others, was orderd forward, the day before, found CS Cavalry, and again the next day, by the Division Officer Prentiss
"Report of Brig. Gen. B. M. Prentiss, U. S. Army, commanding Sixth
Division.
Quincy, III., November 17, 1862.
Colonel : Upon my return from captivity in the hands of the public enemy I have the honor to submit my report of the part taken in the battle of the 6th of April last, near Pittsburg Landing, by the Sixth Division, Army of West Tennessee, the command of which had been assigned to me. I have the honor to transmit field return of the force which was subjected to my control, as it appeared upon the morning of the engagement, the same being marked. A.^
Saturday evening, pursuant to instructions received when I was assigned to duty with the Army of West Tennessee, the usual advance guard was posted, and in view of information received from the commandant thereof, I sent forward five companies of the Twenty-fifth Missouri and five companies of the Twenty-first Missouri Infantry, under command of Col. David Moore, Twenty-first Missouri. I also, after consultation with Col. David Stuart, commanding a brigade of General Sherman's division, sent to the left one company of the Eighteenth Wisconsin Infantry, under command of Captain Fisk.
At about 7 o'clock the same evening Colonel Moore returned, reporting some activity in the front—an evident reconnaissance by cavalry. This information received, I proceeded to strengthen the guard stationed on the Corinth road, extending the picket lines to the front a distance of a mile and a half, at the same time extending and doubling the lines of the grand guard.
At 3 o'clock on the morning of Sunday, April 6, Col. David Moore, Twenty-first Missouri, with five companies of his infantry regiment, proceeded to the front, and at break of day the advance pickets were driven in, whereupon Colonel Moore pushed forward and engaged the enemy's advance, commanded by General Hardee. At this stage a messenger was sent to my headquarters, calling for the balance of the Twenty-first Missouri, which was promptly sent forward. This information received, I at once ordered the entire force into line, and the remaining regiments of the First Brigade, commanded by Col. Everett Peabody, consisting of the Twenty-fifth Missouri, Sixteenth Wisconsin, and Twelfth Michigan Infantry, were advanced well to the front. I forthwith at this juncture communicated the fact of the attack in force to Major-General Smith and Brig. Gen. S. A. Hurlbut.
Shortly before 6 o'clock, Col. David Moore having been severely wounded, his regiment commenced falling back, reaching our front line at about 6 o'clock, the enemy being close upon his rear. Hereupon the entire force, excepting only the Sixteenth Iowa, which had been sent to the field the day previous without ammunition, and the cavalry, which was held in readiness to the rear, was advanced to the extreme front, and thrown out alternately to the right and left.
Eye witnnes account
Wm. J. Hahn, 1st Lt., Co. H., 25th Missouri wrote on April 12, 1914 – "With the assistance of Colonel Everitt Peabody commanding the 1st Brigade of the 6th Division, Major Powell finally got General Prentiss's permission to reconnoitre Sunday morning, but under no circumstances to bring on a general engagement. Major Powell explained these points to me at 10 P.M. Saturday, April 5th and directed me to visit every tent of Co. H and instruct the men to be fully dressed and be ready to march at 3 A.M. Sunday, April 6th……If ever a man deserved a monument it is our brave Major Powell….."
Untill 1882 books and newspapers reported Prentiss as being surprised in his camp, his men butchered in their tents and surrendering in mid morning and he was the one at fault and surprised. In 1895 Shiloh National Military Park was created and Prentiss put the record straight in a lecture series, from his perspective, and he had the written orders to support his version as the OR was now printing the war time correspondence, that Peabody was acting on orders from him, that his battle line was not in the camp but a quarter of mile in front of it, that the dead in tents were there from 2 days o combat and nights rain, and the wia simply went there to get out of ther nights rain,and perished, rather than were killed there asleep, and that what reporters were seeing, and so on. A S Johnston sons bio ( 1879) of his father at Shiloh fully supported Prentiss account that it was Powel who brought on the battle, not Peabody.
Except of course, the link does not support your claims.
Your the only one using telegraph and code, i am talking about the US Wig Wag flag system that was read in real time as the number of left or right wags meant the receiver knew which letter was meant and read/ wrote the comms in real time as the code was in the sending, not receiving.
Grant gave him zero credit, its only when Peabodys nephew wrote a bio and his actions at Shiloh, of him did anyone get the inaccurate idea that Peabody was not following orders. US Grant on Prentiss being surprised " the story that he and his command were surprised and captured in their camps is without any foundation whatever."
First Newspaper reports of Peabody came from Henry Bently, a journalist for the Philadelphia Inquirer, who was present when Powels messenger came back to Peabody, saying the picket line was falling back and asking for reinforcements, Bently indicated that Peabody dismissed the matter as a sharp skirmish. Others such as Whitelaw Reid of the Cincinnati Gazzette had Prentiss Div surprised and its "Soldiers bayoneted in their tents."
Others had Prentiss as a hero, attacking the CS advance gaurd, and Shiloh causing 40k losses on the CSA.
https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83030313/1862-04-09/ed-1/seq-7/?loclr=blogser
Guide to the Battle of Shiloh
By Army War College (U.S.) https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=UEl3AAAAMAAJ&pg=PA33&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=2#v=onepage&q&f=false Gives the after battle combat reports that all show it was Prentiss who gave the orders to Moore, who survived and left an account, and both he and Peabody was following Prentiss orders.
Guide to the Battle of Shiloh
By Army War College (U.S.) https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=UEl3AAAAMAAJ&pg=PA33&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=2#v=onepage&q&f=false Gives that it was Moore who asked Prentiss to go on the picket line ( which included other formations as well as his) and Peabody supported his request.
Your the only one using telegraph and code, i am talking about the US Wig Wag flag system that was read in real time as the number of left or right wags meant the receiver knew which letter was meant and read/ wrote the comms in real time as the code was in the sending, not receiving.
Grant gave him zero credit, its only when Peabodys nephew wrote a bio and his actions at Shiloh, of him did anyone get the inaccurate idea that Peabody was not following orders. US Grant on Prentiss being surprised " the story that he and his command were surprised and captured in their camps is without any foundation whatever."
First Newspaper reports of Peabody came from Henry Bently, a journalist for the Philadelphia Inquirer, who was present when Powels messenger came back to Peabody, saying the picket line was falling back and asking for reinforcements, Bently indicated that Peabody dismissed the matter as a sharp skirmish. Others such as Whitelaw Reid of the Cincinnati Gazzette had Prentiss Div surprised and its "Soldiers bayoneted in their tents."
Others had Prentiss as a hero, attacking the CS advance gaurd, and Shiloh causing 40k losses on the CSA.
https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83030313/1862-04-09/ed-1/seq-7/?loclr=blogser
Guide to the Battle of Shiloh
By Army War College (U.S.) https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=UEl3AAAAMAAJ&pg=PA33&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=2#v=onepage&q&f=false Gives the after battle combat reports that all show it was Prentiss who gave the orders to Moore, who survived and left an account, and both he and Peabody was following Prentiss orders.
No need to wonder, we have a math model to find out a commanders efficiency per 100 men he has, so at Antietam etc, Grant being in command gets you twice the US casualties suffered than historically to inflict the same CS losses.
The JCCOTW wanted Grant fired, as did leading US Senators, and his superior Halleck, only Lincoln wanted him, because as far as lincoln knew, Grant was badly outnumbered but caused c40k casualties to his own of half that, to keep him however meant replacing him with Halleck, and all his orders from then till he outranked Halleck, had to go to Halleck first and be approved and counter signed by Halleck before issued in the field. Halleck had found Grantm often wrote an order and sent it, then made 6+ revisions to it, this drove Halleck nuts.
Grant refused to acept he was suprised at Shiloh "We could not have been better prepared had the enemy sent word three days before when they would attack,' so, no he learnt very little, and what he learned from Henery/Donelson was that to be more concerned about what he was going to do to the enemy rather than worry what they might do to him, this bit him hard at Shiloh , and lee taught him it again out East where what the opponent is capable and intent on doing you harm, is rather important.
Except of course lee found enough troops to send Early into the valley and threaten the capital, and Grant refused to send 6th corps, and 19th Corps m was diverted from its operations, to defend it and had to be ordered to send 6th corps to defend the capital, and was able to reinforce Buregard to defend the Petersburg line, and it took 9 months to take Richmond. Overland by Nov was an attritional failure, acording to Welles and others and they expected to lose the election, as over 90% of the AoP average field army strength ( or 80% of the hune field army strength became cascualties in 7 month period) had become casualties that needed to be replaced, no US Army had by then, or ever afterwards had such a loss rate, Russian armies in ww2 did, Chinese armies in Korea in human wave assualts did, Iranian human wave assualts in Iran Iraq war did.
Bonekemper claim in his book that Grants losses in 64 amounted to 52788, and claims this proves Grant was not a butcher, The US War department otoh list the AoP losses for 64 at 88387 for 1864, for the same period bonkemper cherry picked and ommitted what he did not like from, https://www.nytimes.com/1865/09/17/archives/union-losses-in-1864-the-total-loss-of-the-army-of-the-potomac-in.html and was reported in the press, so we can reject Bonekembers attempts to deciece readers by inventing numbers as revisionist nonsense.
Grants monthly reports to War Dept with his strength/% of ANV to AoP Newton page 74
AoP PDF
June 110,262 /57.3%
August 60,167/88.3%
Oct 90,043/57.4%
Nov 96,378/65.7%
Dec 111,919/63.9%
S Newton Lost for the cause, the attrition myth chapter, shows on pages 75 onwards the relative PFD strengths ( unlike G Rhea who is also basilcly inumerate, who compares CS effective to US PFD and spoils an otherwise good account of the period ) shows that the ANV was 57.3% of the Aop PFD strength in June, by end of year it was 63.9%, so Grant was losing the attrition war not winning it in VA and it was Lees army that grew stronger and was able to detach forces for other purposes, and this was only possible by the strategic choices of Davis of what to do with CS manpower, ie put it against Grant or employ it elsewhere.
Logically its never been up for debate as Bonekemper asks readers to acept an army of 1000 with 100 losses is a 10% loss rate, when it fights an army of 100 with a loss rate of 10, and it has a 10% loss rate then both sides are equal at 10% loss rate and there is no butchery of the larger side by the smaller, despite a loss ratio of 10 to one.
And yet it is on the net, but only from Northern revisionist who misuse math, Grants lost 2 for every casualty he inflicted, despite a 1.9 to 1 manpower advantage on average, lee inlicted 1.4 for every casualty he suffered,despite being outnumbered 1.6 to 1 on average. It was up for debate when his ( Grants) own side called him it during the war, NY Times listing his casualties as a third of the Army, and then by both sides post war, He never complained about it or denied his losses, no one ever called lee a butcher till the 20th century.
Until the 20th century Northern authors wrote that slavery was financially uneconomic, now we know different and the slave owners were right that it was, so some revisionism is useful. Everyone who can count or was aware of what his and Lincoln's strategy was, has always know Grant was a butcher who relied on attrition, only the revisionist claim otherwise, and have to misuse use math to do so and invent a new definition of what a casualty was, ignore his and Lincoln's explanation of strategy employed, this is revisionism of no use.
Author J Rose
"With seemingly endless casualty lists, the one "long graveyard" of the Overland Campaign earned Grant the epithet of "butcher," from a soldier on the field to the First Lady, Mary Lincoln. Too subjective a label to form a substantive basis for debate, his supporters challenged it, telling red-herring stories of how Grant only ate meat well-done, felt pained at seeing injured soldiers, or presided over a much-loved family. The basis for such criticisms of the Lieutenant-General stemmed from his style and methods of warfare: attacks all along the line and against fortified positions, de-emphasis of tactical and strategic maneuver, failure to succor the wounded, and the inadequate interment of his dead soldiers, amidst lackadaisical management and incompetent staffwork."
Gen Ord served in Mississippi
"We are not making real war-but slaughtering men to no purpose and I feel ashamed , indeed disgusted at being a party to such proceedings - if things go on in this way the rebs are bound to win, and I don't care to help with that end"
and also in Va under Grants methods.
"Oh my - what a sad sad thing is war- we had it here in all its horrors yesterday. When hundreds-nay thousands, were killed and wounded to no apparent end or purpose- except that so much humanity should cease to be or should suffer- I was among those who did not get hurt but, the taste for blood-more blood seems to be none the less- and is there no one responsible for this- to be no end to it- I feel quite sick with shame at being unable to even say what I think, or help to stop it- well maybe I can help it- any how I will try -even at the risk of falling under the ban of the men who rule and allow it. I feel so acutely when I see great wrongs being committed of men over, or against each other"
WSC wrote of Grants "unflinching butchery" as he saw it. During Vicksburg and in Overland Grant refused to ask for a truce, and so admit defeat, and 000s of his own Wia died as result, he refused to allow pow exchanges and 000s more pows died that did not need to die.
WSC
"more is expected of the high command than determination in thrusting men to their doom," and his performance in the Eastern theatre of war "must be regarded as the negation of generalship."
Vid of J Rose for those who prefer vids, to books
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FB6t2wr1K_Y and in book form. https://www.amazon.co.uk/Grant-Under-Fire-Generalship-Character/dp/1943177007
We are concerned with if how he practised the military art, and if those methods support the term butcher, just as Generals such as Haig acquired. In courses for education of military strategy, one of the required reading books is https://www.amazon.co.uk/American-Way-War-Military-Strategy/dp/025328029X in it Grants traditional methods are explained and the butchery it called for, it concludes "‘there is no good reason to believe that the Army of Northern Virginia could have been destroyed within an acceptable time by any other means than the hammer blows of Grant’s army.’”
US Army uses Grant command failures at shiloh to teach from. https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll2/id/3065/ as an example of "Among the more important conclusions of the thesis are: 1. Although the Union forces below division level anticipated the Confederate attack. Grant and his command echelon were completely surprised. 2. Surprise was achieved because the Union had violated several principles of war, chiefly: objective, offensive, maneuver, unity of command, and security."
Ohio Congressman Samuel S. Cox, "I don't think he shows skill in hurrying so many into death & agony. Is it butchery, or-war?" Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles Grant was "a butcher who harbored too little regard for human life"
""I do not believe," Grant confessed, "that the officers of the regiment ever discovered that I had never studied the tactics that I used." Grant training at leading an Army, even down down to a Brigade, was zero, he had never been trained for any command role.
He promoted friends, who then let him down all his life, Wilson in 64 failed to recce the flanks of the AoP and Lee turned him, Sheridan failed to get there before Lees troops, with quicker troops a shorter road and ended with another frontal charge, and Grant was guilty of nepotism, he took credit for others action, at Missionary ridge he rdererd the army to advance to the foot of the heights, when it carried on he said who was reponsible for that ordr, orders that will suffer professionally, when it was a success, he took the credit instead. He thought he was outnumbered at Shiloh as he though the CS had 100k, so he was objectively far worse than anyone in the entire war, at over estimating enemy strength. At the Academy he only read fiction for pleasure, Grant said he never studied anything, he relied on reading it once, and remembering what he had read. His views on lee as a General, border on the criminally negligent.
Shiloh?, he is caught by surprise, not thinking there was a CS army anywhere near him, was attacked while he slept 8 miles away behind a river, and arrives on the battlefield 3or so hours into it, unable to walk without use of crutches, to find disaster as he has ignored orders to have entrenched, he fails to even ask Buell to hurry up and directs his only reserve Wallace to the wrong place and misses the entire first day, spending 7 hours marching in the wront direction, leaving the Army to fight without any reserves!. He orders Prentiss to hold at all hazards at Hornets, its Buell who saves Grant, not Grant saving Grant, and then blames the surrounded Prentiss for surrendering when encircled, because of Grants orders to hold. Caeser led his reserve and fought in the front rank, grant was on crutches sending his reserve the wrong way, if your going to try to use historical anology, learn some history first.
Crossing the Rubicorn moment only came because ( which he does as 5 other modes of operation have flailed, and to retreat would mean being sacked leaving only to risk all by cutting loose from his supply lines ) during the 18 months he took to get his Objective, just as a 9 month siege of Richmond, is as slow an outcome that makes Mac look like a lightning rod of alacrity.
Except that he tried and flailed, tried and flailed, and kept on doing so until he did not fail, fumble around seems right for well over a years activity and not getting close to your aim. " Much of Grant's advance on Vicksburg was highly commendable, but his previous bungling for months in the Delta's swamps and his assaults on the city detracted from even that campaign." as one educated author has it.
The uneducated poster, is Hugh de Salle who left school in the Uk at 16 without having taken any coueses on US history, kindly funny really, since your post content, seem to share so much with his.
So you think Grant was surrounded and outnumbered around three to one when in fact it Grant with the manpower advantage, despite thinking the CSA army was 100,000 strong, or that Grant fought with his men in combat as did Ceaser at Alesia instead of being unable to walk and never fought at shiloh. Best you read an entry level book on Shiloh and Ceaser.
General William Nelson on the effects of Grants efforts of rallying. Grants contribution is to direct the only reserve, L Wallace the wrong way and miss the first days fighting, and instruct prentisss to hold, and then blame him for becoming surrounded and surrender.
"I found cowering under the river hank when I crossed from 7,000 to 10,000 men, frantic with fright and utterly demoralized, who received my gallant division with cries, "We are whipped; cut to pieces." They were insensible to shame or sarcasm-for I tried both on them-and, indignant at such poltroonery, I asked permission to open fire upon the knaves."
"We reached Pittsburg Landing at about 9 o'clock p. m. By order of General Buell my command was debarked as soon as it could be done, it being important to send back the boat, that McCook's division might be brought up for the battle of the next day. We had great difficulty in landing our troops. The bank of the river at the landing was covered with from 6,000 to 10,000 entirely demoralized soldiery. I was so disgusted, that I asked General Buell to permit me to land a regiment and drive them away. I did not wish my troops to come in contact with them. We landed, however, forcing our way through this mob, and stood to our arms all night on the road, half a mile from the landing, at the place designated by General Buell."
Brigadier General T. L. Crittenden
Yes revisionist always like to avoid actual historical term used at the time for what happened by northern senators, Generals and newpapers, and replace them with their own.
Grant was under political pressure to end the war before the election, hence the massive increase in Union casualties that the AoP have never before seen. The casualty rate in Mac getting to the gates of Richmond, with a siege train was almost non existent, Grant in 40 days got there at extreme loss of life, and did not send for the siege train till long after he got there, the whole point of getting there was to use attrition in doing so.
Both tried maneuver concepts, one with a massive casualty list and one without it, manouverist just like to move to where the greatest advantage of the effects of attrition ( a siege with you having more and better Art) can be applied, atritionalist just like the increased the rate its applied at, full stop. Grant could have got to where he ended up without any casualties in 64 by use of sea lift, he did not, because the whole point of getting there was the infliction of losses while doing so.
Grants own word show you have no clue as to Grant intentions, "The carnage was was be confined to a singe year to achieve at that was anticipated or desired"
the AoP average loss rate to death from disease, using the SG reports for white troops, was 0.2% a month, under Grant 0.5%, for none white 1.3% a month which does not reflect well on how Grant saw/treated his expendable assets.
I agree an education is helpful, which is why Hugh leaving schoool at 16 without any education in the UK, on US history, shows how helpfull it would have been.
Of course, the purpose of education is to teach you how to think, there are no books approved in the education system that teach Grant was not a butcher, and many that explain why he was called one in the war and since the war, by authors writting both general histories and histories of the AoP. But yes, those who learnt how to think at school, will have noticed Bonkemper the revisionist, replaced what a casualty is, made up some numbers to support his pre concienvied opinion.ignoreerd the data that did not support himself, and asked readers to go along with him, the educated know, he is just another D Irving revisionsist.
In the Grant is taught as being called a butcher during the war, and explain why that was so, and that Grant used lincolns attritional policies to end it. R L Ransom at Berkley is just one of many universities where your taught Grant used attrition to close out the war. Newpaper of June 22, 1864, referred to "Grant, the butcher, who heartlessly hurls his men on bloody defeat."
Mackubin T. Owens, USN War College
"Grant, on the other hand, has been described as a "butcher." According to the conventional wisdom, Grant lacked strategic sense and tactical competence and was able to achieve victory only by taking advantage of the manpower and material superiority of the Union to bludgeon his opponent into submission."
You might even learn the first biographies of Grant were all written by his friends just before election time, and Grant only allowed them to go to print because they were favorable accounts that he provided access to the US War department records for, accounts that he did not like ( reporting on his refusal to get US pows out of CS prisons etc|) in newspapers he had the papers closed down. Those he did not like, he prevented from being published, Pollards for instance. US Sec Dana explains they were "carefully guarded against any expression which could be used against him by the politicians" in the upcoming election.
Generals who did not give POTUS what he wanted were all replaced, lincoln was an looking for an attritional General and found him in Grant.
Lincoln
".. if the same battle were to be fought over again, every day, through a week of days, with the same relative results, the army under Lee would be wiped out to the last man, the Army of the Potomac would still be a mighty host, the war would be over, the Confederacy gone, and peace would be won at a smaller cost of life than it will be if the week of lost battles must be dragged out through yet another year of camps and marches, and of deaths in hospitals rather than upon the field."
Lincoln after Fredericksburg after removing Burnside. Note that this is explicitly endorsing/wanting attritional combat as his national strategy which he expects his generals to operate under, and Burnside refused to, its also mathematically wrong by Lincoln as 7 such Fredercksburg leaves the ANV at 48k to the AoP 33k at a ratio of just over 3 to 1 exchange rate in CS favour, to wipe out the ANV, the AoP would have to be over twice its historical size and suffer nearly a quarter of a million casualties.
Lincoln
"To avoid misunderstanding, let me say that to attempt to fight the enemy slowly back into his entrenchments at Richmond, and there to capture him, is an idea I have been trying to repudiate for quite a year. My judgment is so clear against it, that I would scarcely allow the attempt to be made, if the general in command should desire to make it."
Grant cautioned the government that the cost of Overland would be and additional 100,000 casualties, ( he was off as he suffered 127,000 in the next 12 months, excluding sick l;osses) which was why he wanted 200k+ to go South with, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=chi.19958599&view=1up&seq=391. More than had been incurred since the war had began would now come about in 6 weeks he thought, from an AoP that would be the biggest it ever had been allowed to be, nearly twice what Mac was allowed to do the same job, and given 9 months to Mac 3.
US Grant explaining his use of attrition.
"I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy...Second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the Constitution and laws of the land. These views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given and campaigns made to carry them out. Whether they might have been better in conception and execution is for the people, who mourn the loss of friends fallen, and who have to pay the pecuniary cost, to say. All I can say is, that what I have done has been done conscientiously, to the best of my ability, and in what I conceived to be for the best interests of the whole county."
As for a military education
https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll3/id/1523/rec/50
"Grant's inability to outmaneuver Robert E. Lee caused the campaign to rely on attrition for a decision. Grant may have wanted to defeat Lee through a campaign of maneuver, but he adopted a conservative approach instead since he was secure in his overall
superiority of resources Unless he did something very stupid, the manpower and industrial might of the North almost guaranteed victory. Unfortunately, the cost in lives was much more than it might have been had he conducted a successful campaign of maneuver"
Guide to the Battle of Shiloh
By Army War College (U.S.) https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=UEl3AAAAMAAJ&pg=PA33&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=2#v=onepage&q&f=false Gives that it was Moore who asked Prentiss to go on the picket line ( which included other formations as well as his) and Peabody supported his request.
Its pointless in war to lose lives with no gain and this is exactly what George McClellan did he wasted Union lives for nothing so no matter how you portray his kill to deaths ratio he achieved nothing.
Hannibal could win all his battles inflicting heavy casualties but he couldn't win a war.
As for Peabody.
Quote:
Powell wisely chose to withdraw, and was soon reinforced by additional troops sent forward by Peabody. In the meantime, Peabody had been visited by an angry Prentiss, who, having found out that a force of Peabody’s men had advanced and been fired upon, declared that he would “hold (Peabody) personally responsible for bringing on this engagement.”
Peabody contemptuously replied that he was personally responsible for all of his actions, and rode away. Prentiss never forgave Peabody, nor gave him the credit he deserved. In his official report of the battle, he barely mentioned his name.
Embarrassed for you.
Mac was highly cost effective and had he had the same political confidence that was given to Grant, the war may have been over quicker with less of life.
Hannibal, most cost effective general of the Punic wars, yet he lost, but not because he was not cost effective, but because the relative imbalance in resources was higher than his cost effectiveness.
Lee was cost effective, but not at a rate high enough to overmatch the relative imbalance of resources, except when he faced Grant, then he was overmatching the US mobilisation rate.
Your Peabody copy paste quote is for several hours after the CS had attacked the picket line and just shows how uninformed you are as you dont understand what it says.