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Memerad von Dankenmeme
And you're not going to get that many people who Disagree with that, mate.
Moltke wasn't a Moron so much as the bad combination of overconfident and nervous. During the Battle of the Marne he suffered a nervous breakdown and flat out COULDN'T issue orders, something that isn't surprising if you've ever seen someone suffer a nervous break like I have.
He certainly was a disappointment compared to his father, but he was no Luigi Cadorna or Enver Pasha.
Uh, no he wasn't downright stupid. Especially because on this point he was RIGHT.
Machine Guns WERE AND ARE overrated in the list of reasons why WWI was a hideously ugly conflict, and particularly why it was hard to break through a defensive line.
Artillery, not machine guns, were the queen of the battle nad the cause of the majority of casualties both on the offensive and the defensive. And as a veteran British officer Haig knew full damn well that you could put a small team of riflemen together and have them substitute for a machine gun pretty effectively (this was what volley fire and the mad minute were about, and why
Also, this ignores the fact that if anything, Haig's problems ran the OTHER DIRECTION from what this witty little anecdote would have one believe.
He correctly grasped that artillery was the dominant weapon of the battlefield, and incorrectly assesed its'' power and prospects for conquering a position.
The result was the First Day of the Somme, when the German positions that were SUPPOSED to be destroyed or all but conquered by artillery were scarcely damaged in spite of the largest artillery barrage in the history of the WORLD up to that point. And the blood cost was hideous.
So he adjusted.
And furthermore, it ignores that he was so interested in countering the power of machine guns, mortars, and light artillery that he OBSESSED TOO MUCH with creating new, innovative tech like the Tank. Which helped break through the German positions the Allies were facing on the Somme, but also clogged up the front and played hell with the supply lines.
Haig was not a natural, military genius but he was not down right stupid. And unlike Hoetzendorff and Moltke and Cadorna he learned. A Lot.
Which is why the parade of hacks who condemn him as stupid have to ignore his almost universally praised junior officers (Currie, Plumer, Monash, shall I go on?) and how they collaborated swimmingly with their boss.
Perhaps. I'm certianly not a General, though I play one on the computer. And I think I'm humble enoguh to admit that I do not know how the hell I would handle a major combat operation.
But I AM Pretty sure that if I was called upon to do so, I would at least try and get reliable intelligence on my enemy. As much as possible.
Such as- say- WHERE THE HELL THEY HAVE THEIR ARTILLERY PRACTICE.
So that I can avoid said artillery range as a natural, pre-scoped Death Trap.
I think that's a fairly reasonable, basic precaution that even untrained little me could suggest.
Except Conrad's active career DID NOT DEAL with the Trenches, or at least many of them.
He fought several of the last free moving, formation battles in history.
And he generally sucked at it.
A: MALDEPLOYMENT: Simply put, the guy mishandled deployments badly. Starting with the fact that he stretched himself far too thin between two fronts and as a result was defeated on both of them. Which was why
B: Contempt of the Enemy: He constantly, Endlessly underestimated everybody but himself and thus routinely wound up short. Which can be seen with the condescending "mercy" he extended by letting Putnik return from his vacation in Habsburg territory rather than detaining him, which resulted in Putnik being the man who thrashed him throughout 1914.
C: Inflexibility: Conrad wasn't so much authoritarian- most army commanders are- as despotic. Inidivdual initiative by the comamnded was discouraged in many militaries of the time, but it was all but criminalized under his tenure as CoS. which is ironic since it was one of the things that helped earn him his early promotions.
and
D: War Mongering: Conrad has the dubious distinction of advocating for war against Serbia for years. Hence why he supported "Pre-Emptive War" without even waiting for a casus belli like Sarajevo.
In addition to being an atrocious act in its' own right, this makes his failures to prepare adequately all that much more glaring.