© A S☫heil presentation; First published 14 April 2023; Updated 13 May 2023


1. Table of Contents Updated 15 April 2023

2. Introduction

3. Background Updated 13 May 2023

4. First announcement of the Hwasongpho-18 ICBM

5. Specs

6. Forecast Updated 16 April 2023

7. Conclusion Updated 16 April 2023


Since the 2010s, it was the stated goal of Iran and North Korea to develop a credible nuclear deterrent.

The liquid propellant Moksong-1 (Jupiter-1) and Moksong-2 ICBMs (also known as militarized Paektusan and Unha SLVs) were already mastered in 2012.

After liquid propellant ballistic missiles, the shift to an all solid propellant ballistic missiles forces was also announced back in 2012.


The solid-fuel Qaem ICBM was first disclose back in 2011, and presented in two versions. The civilian space launcher with a 3.5 meter diameter, and the military version with a 2 meter diameter.

Qaem (قائم) solid propellant space launcher

Qaem is Iran's civilian satellite carrier made of 4 stages.

Qaem is named after Imam Mahdi (PBUH) in the 9th century.

Qaem (قائم) or Ghaem (from Arabic: al-Qa’im, the one who has risen, a title for the 12th Imam al-Mahdi(PBUH)), is the last of the 12 Imams that Sh11te Muslims worship.

They believe that Imam Mahdi (PBUH) will reappear as a savior at the end of the world.

The militarized version, is Iran's solid propellant land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), under the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)'s Global Strike Command.

It is also a land-launched nuclear vector for Iran's planned nuclear triad.

The civilian satellite carrier is made of 4 stages:

• First stage of 3.5 meters diameter, 20 meters long
• Second stage of 2 meters diameter, 11.5 meters long
• Third stage of 1.7 meters diameter, 4.5 meters long
• Fourth stage of 1.25 meters diameter, 4.5 meters long

The first stage is only used in the satellite carrier. While the other are used in the militarized ICBM version.

▲ Official Qaem SLV drawings. Screen capture of the military.ir forum when accessed on 19th February 2019.[web.archive.org]
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▲ Qaem SLV internet CGI. 2020.[web.archive.org]
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▲ Qaem SLV first stage. Tasnimnews October 2019.[web.archive.org]
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▲ Model of Qaem SLV and Chabahar Space Center. November 2021.[web.archive.org]
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Oprindeligt skrevet af mehrnews:

First Iranian announcement

According to a report by Mehr News Agency on 11th November 2020, Sardar Majid Mousavi, Deputy Commander of the Air Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, said: We have become a leader in manufacturing missile machine gun silos, one of the most powerful countries with various missile systems, medium-range, long-range missiles, and intercontinental missiles.

▲ IRGC Aerospace Force Deputy Sardar Majid Mousavi disclosed Iran's possession of an ICBM capability。[web.archive.org]
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▲ IRGC Aerospace Force Deputy Sardar Majid Mousavi disclosed Iran's possession of an ICBM capability。[web.archive.org]
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At the same time, mentions of a North Korean Super-Topol-class ICBM started to emerge back in 2012. 1[web.archive.org] 1[web.archive.org]

North Korean Qaem SLV

Satellite imagery of the 'Place of the ascension of Martyrs’ (35.624581°N 50.872523°E) at the Shahid Modarres Garrison shows that before the 12 November 2011 explosion, the site was housing a rail-movable hangar, cranes and large cylindrical objects.

The epicenter of the 2011 explosion might be a large casting pit with a moveable superstructure.

The measured diameter of the casting pit is about 5 meters, and can be used to cast rocket motors of diameters up to 3.5 meters for the Qaem SLV.

▲ Large casting pit of of about 5 meters diameters at the Shahid Modarres Garrison.[web.archive.org]
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The same large casting pit with a moveable superstructure has been built thereafter at the Imam Sadegh Satellite Launch Center.

The measured diameter of the casting pit of about 5 meters, and is used to cast the 3.5 meter diameter Qaem SLV first stage.

▲ Large casting pit of about 5 meters diameters at the Imam Sadegh SLC.[web.archive.org]
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Recent satellite imagery of 5th Febryary 2018 have revealed a similar site in North Korea’s Chemical Materials Institute, a key facility for the production of solid-rocket motors.

July 25, 2018

This imagery shows some unique features that appear to be related to testing or finishing solid motor case production. Among these is a circular foundation in the southern fabrication building that measures (approximately 4 meters-in-diameter, interior dimension) and surrounds an excavation of undetermined depth.

The intended purpose of this excavation is unclear. One suggested purpose would be to fulfill a requirement for pressure testing, degreasing, or coating filament-wound rocket motor casings prior to being filled.[6] Alternately, if this pit is intended for hydro-pressure testing—during which the pressure is slowly increased until the case fails—it would require a dome or heavy lid to keep it sealed during testing.

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▲ Large casting pit of of about 4 meters diameters at the North Korea’s Chemical Materials Institute (CMI). 39°57'29.08N 127°33'35.24E [web.archive.org]
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▲ North Korean version of the Iranian Qaem SLV. 주체105(2016)년 3월 4일[web.archive.org]
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Given that North Korea has been testing large diameter solid rocket motors for the Pukguksong-series for several years, it's been clear (to me at least) that since 2020 a test like this could have come at any time.

The speed is mind-boggling surprising and the direction always clear:

Jan 2021: 8th WPK Congress Report

Dec 2022: static test of new motor with claimed 140tf

Feb 2023: ICBM associated TELs with new canisters

Apr 2023: First solid fuel ICBM test

Oprindeligt skrevet af kcna.kp:

Another Mighty Entity Showing Continuous Development of Strategic Force Unveiled in DPRK

Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides First Test-Fire of New-Type ICBM Hwasongpho-18 on Spot

Pyongyang, April 14 (KCNA) -- The DPRK's nuclear war deterrent for self-defence is rapidly developing at increasing speed in keeping with the immutable strategic line and policy of the Workers' Party of Korea and the government of the DPRK to ceaselessly develop the might of the strategic force of the DPRK to turn it into an entity of super power and absolute strength, a powerful force capable of preventing the nuclear holocaust and deterring all sorts of possible dangerous enemy invasions, and a treasured sword for defending justice and peace.

On April 13, 2023, a powerful entity symbolic of the ceaseless development of the strategic force of the DPRK notified the world of its emergence.

A new-type ICBM, Hwasongpho-18, which will fulfill its mission of an important war deterrent as the future core pivotal means of the strategic force of the DPRK, was test-fired.

Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, guided the first test-fire of the new-type ICBM on the spot.

The aim of the test-fire was to confirm the performance of the high-thrust solid-fuel engines for multi-stage missiles and the reliability of the stage-jettisoning technology and various functional control systems and to estimate the military feasibility of the new strategic weapon system.

In consideration of the security of the neighboring countries and the safety of the multi-stage-separation of the missile during its flight in the territorial air, the test fire was conducted in the way of applying the standard trajectory flying mode to its first stage and the vertical mode to the second and third stages, and of confirming the technological features of all the components of the weapon system by restricting the maximum speed of the missile through delayed stage separation and motor reactivation.

Kim Jong Un learned about the new weapon system on the spot while watching the pre-launch operation.

The launching site, which was to witness once again an important event of great significance in the history of the development of the strategic force of the DPRK under the direct guidance of Kim Jong Un, was seething with the burning will of all the defence scientists and workers in the field of munitions industry to inform the whole world of the emergence of another powerful nuclear attack means of the DPRK and demonstrate the reliable nuclear war deterrence of the state.

Ready for test-fire!

When Kim Jong Un approved the test-fire of the new-type strategic weapon, General Jang Chang Ha ordered the second red flag company under the General Missile Bureau to launch the missile.

The moment, a great entity fully representing the irresistible might of the DPRK began to soar into the sky with fierce flames at its tail, making a thunderous roar.

The test-fire had no adverse effect on the security of the neighboring countries. Its first stage safely landed in the waters 10 km off the Hodo Peninsula in Kumya County, South Hamgyong Province and the second stage in the waters 335 km east of Orang County, North Hamgyong Province.

The test-fire confirmed that all the parameters of the new strategic weapon system fully met the requirements of the design in terms of accuracy, providing guarantee and creditability that the new-type ICBM would serve as a powerful strategic attack means of greater military efficiency.

The Hwasongpho-18 weapon system, to be equipped with and operated by the strategic force of the DPRK under the long-term plan for building the state nuclear force, will perform its important mission and duty as the most powerful, pivotal and principal means in defending the DPRK, deterring aggression and defending the security of the state.

Kim Jong Un expressed great satisfaction at the eye-opening successes while guiding the test-fire. He was pleased with the fact that the DPRK has clearly proved once again the tremendous potentiality and reality of its defence technology further developing as the days go by and powerfully demonstrated its unshakable determination and practical ability to attain the goal for bolstering up the armed forces.

He noted that it is the consistent stand of the Workers' Party of Korea and the DPRK government to steadily and rapidly accelerate the development of more developed and advanced powerful weapon system to cope with the ever-worsening security environment of the Korean peninsula and long-term military threats. He mentioned with pride the significance of the test-fire, saying that the development of the new-type ICBM Hwasongpho-18 will extensively reform the strategic deterrence components of the DPRK, radically promote the effectiveness of its nuclear counterattack posture and bring about a change in the practicality of its offensive military strategy.

Noting that it is an absolute mission and duty to be fulfilled by the DPRK's defence scientists to uphold the WPK and the DPRK government's policy of countering the enemy's nukes and policy of frontal confrontation in kind with practical successes in the development of self-defence capabilities, he set forth the important strategic tasks for further accelerating the bolstering of the nuclear strategic force of the DPRK.

He affirmed that the WPK and the DPRK government would make the enemy, who are imperiling the environment on the Korean peninsula and harassing the Korean people's peaceful life and struggle for socialist construction with their inveterate policy of aggression and threatening military moves, experience a clearer security crisis, and constantly strike extreme uneasiness and horror into them by taking fatal and offensive counter-actions until they abandon their senseless thinking and reckless acts, thus making them feel regret and despair for their wrong choice by surely exposing them to an irresistible threat.

The successful test of the new strategic weapon system serves as an occasion for proving that the nuclear strategic force and the missile scientists and technicians of the DPRK directly responsible for its development always thoroughly and perfectly implement the strategic intention of the WPK, getting fully prepared to carry out their important mission at any time. -0-
www.kcna.kp (Juche112.4.14.)

▲ First Test-Fire of New-Type ICBM Hwasongpho-18.[web.archive.org]
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▲ First Test-Fire of New-Type ICBM Hwasongpho-18.[web.archive.org]
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▲ First Test-Fire of New-Type ICBM Hwasongpho-18.[web.archive.org]
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Video of the test launch

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7cC1QMUcLLk
▲ 신형대륙간탄도미싸일《화성포-18》형 첫 시험발사【동영상】First Test-Fire of New-Type ICBM Hwasongpho-18[Eng-Sub]新型ICBM火星砲⒙型初試射 [web.archive.org]
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▲ 3D CGI of Hwasongpho-18 ICBM· Apr 14, 2023[web.archive.org]
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The physical characteristics of the missile appear to be:
- 3 stages
- larger diameter first stage based on probably the December 2022 Solid Rocket Motor
- smaller upper stages, probably similar in diameter to Pukguksong-3 (or slightly larger)
- cold launch similar to the Pukguksong-2

Geolocation

First North Korean ICBM launch out of 14 total from grass, not bare concrete.

Obviously, the Hwasong artillery men are trying to promote advanced ICBM TEL maneuverability and versatility.

▲ New Solid Fuel ICBM Hwasongpho-18 launch geolocated: 39.111832°, 125.997618°[web.archive.org]
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Photogrammetric Measurement and Analysis

Stage 1: 2.21 m diameter x 10.35 m length
Stage 2: 1.90 m diameter x 5.90 m length
Stage 3: 1.90 m diameter x 4.87 m length
Hwasongpho-18 total: 2.21 m max diameter x 26.51 m length

▲ This is the adjusted scaling image.. · Apr 14, 2023[web.archive.org]
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Mass estimation

▲ I run those numbers on my ballistic missile calculator. A missile with such dimensions would weight ~89 tons. · Apr 14, 2023[web.archive.org]
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Specs of DF-41 ICBM

DF-41 ICBM

Basing: Road-mobile, Rail-mobile, Silo
Length: 20 – 22 m
Diameter: 2.25 m
Launch weight: 80,000 kg
Payload: 2,500 kg
Warhead: Up to 10 nuclear warheads; MIRV
Propulsion: Three-stage solid propellant
Range: 12,000 – 15,000 km

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CZ-11 SLV
Overall Length: 20.3 m
Stage 1 Diameter: 2 m
Gross liftoff weight: 58 t
Payload weight: 350 kg SSO

Kuaizhou-11 SLV
Overall Length: 25.3 m
Stage 1 Diameter: 2.2 m
Gross liftoff weight: 78 t
Payload weight: 1000 kg SSO

▲ Specs of DF-41 ICBM and derives CZ-11 and KZ-11 SLVs.[web.archive.org]
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Specs of Topol-M ICBM

The RT-2PM2 “Topol-M” (NATO designation: SS-27 “Sickle B”), is a Russian solid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 11,000 km.
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Basing: Road-mobile, silo-based
Length: 21.9 m
Diameter: 1.9 m
Launch weight: 47,000 kg
Payload: Single warhead, 1,200 kg
Warhead: Nuclear 500 kT
Propulsion: Three-stage solid propellant
Range: 11,000 km

Estimated Range

On the April 13th, North Korea launched a ballistic missile from Pyongyang to the eastern waters of the peninsula. The missile was launched at a higher elevation angle than normal. After flying about 1'000 kilometers, it landed in the eastern waters of the peninsula. During this period, the highest point of the ballistic trajectory was less than 3'000 kilometers.

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▲ Footprint of the Hwasongpho-18 ICBM test flight.· Apr 14, 2023[web.archive.org]
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▲ Flight profile of the Hwasongpho-18 ICBM test flight according to South Korea.[web.archive.org]
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▲ Range of recent North Korean missiles· Mar 16, 2023[web.archive.org]
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From the lofted trajectories to normal trajectories MET range graphic, a 3'000 km altitude apogee would mean a 8'000 km MET range if launched on a normal angle trajectory, similar to the Hwasong-14 ICBM.

But the reported 3'000 km altitude apogee was not reached with a lofted trajectory, as the flight profile of the Hwasongpho-18 test flight shows that the first stage was launched at a normal angle, probably to limit the risk of a break up due to excessive aerodynamic stress.
Only the second and third stage have followed a vertical trajectory.

In addition state media also reported that the ICBM restricted its velocity with 'delayed stage separation', which most likely means that the missile coasted in space with the burnout stage before discarding this deadweight and the ignition of the next stage. The 'delayed stage separation' would also suggest that the DPRK has successfully developed techniques for unpowered coasting, a mechanism frequently used in satellite launches.

It is therefore assumed that the Hwasongpho-18 ICBM MET range would easily exceed the 8'000 km mark, if launched on a normal angle. With more likely MET range of 12'000 km to 15'000 km and similar to the Hwasongpho-15 ICBM.
Range consistent with the fact that the Hwasongpho-18 has a larger size than the DF-41, with a rated 15'000 km range.

Roll and Attitude Control System (RACS)

▲ The design solution of a liquid RFNA roll-thruster for single nozzle, larger diameter SLV/ICBM. Shown by 🇮🇷 Iran on 5th November 2022 IRGC Qaem-100 SLV.[web.archive.org]
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▲ Shown by 🇰🇵 DPRK on 17th November 2022 Hwasongpho-17 ICBM.[web.archive.org]
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▲ Shown by 🇰🇵 DPRK on 13th April 2023 Hwasongpho-18 ICBM.[web.archive.org]
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World ranking

Currently, if not on par with the Chinese DF-41, the Hwasongpho-18 might be the world largest TEL-launched solid-fuel ICBM.

For the DPRK:
Six years from 1st (liquid) ICBM flight to 1st solid ICBM flight.

7/8 years from 1st major solid motor test to solid ICBM flight.

Outside of the US that's the fastest any country has developed a solid ICBM.
US did it in 5 years (1957 to 1962)
DPRK did it in 6 years (2017 to 2023)
USSR did it in 9 years (1957 to 1966)
India did it in 13 years
China in 19 years
France in 21 years


The DPRK needs to demonstrate several more technological breakthroughs before the Hwasongpho-18 ICBM could be mass produced and fielded.

These include the testing of a post boost vehicle (PBV), miniaturised nuclear warhead and associated MIRVs, and PENAID decoys.


Ballistic missiles will be totally obsolete by 2027, upon completion of the U.S. 42'000 Starlink orbital WMD.

But converted in a civilian space launcher, based on the technologies developed for the Hwasongpho-18, it would be able to place 1 to 2 tons payload into a 500 km to 1000 km SSO, provided a 4th upper stage is added.

▲ North Korean space launchers: Notice the solid-fuel Qaem/Hwasongpho-18 space launcher derivative. 2020.[web.archive.org]
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This would allow North Korea to join the elite club of space powers able to launch satellite on a very short notice, and even from the sea on a barge, thus not limited to the higher latitude of North Korea, and similar to Chinese space companies.

The most important advantage of a sea launch capability will be to finally solve once and for all the bottleneck of overflying both Japan's and South Korea's airspaces, a chocking point that has systematically sparked diplomatic rows during each past space launches.

▲ Map of trajectories for DPRK sea launched SSO and GEO space flights, with SLV derived from the Hwasongpho-18 ICBM.[web.archive.org]
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Coming just 4 years before being made obsolete by the U.S. Starlink, this ICBM will provide national pride and an enhanced international status for only a very brief period.

But this is the path decided by Iranian brains back a decade ago. Nonetheless, failing to improve the two Asian nations' military status durably, the development of the Qaem/Hwasongpho-18 ICBM has boosted the North East Asian space power into the elite club of those with solid-propellant space launcher capability.