© A S☫heil presentation; First published 6 OCT 2021; Updated 7 SEP 2023

1. Table of Contents

1. Table of Contents Updated 24 NOV 2022
2. Introduction
3. History of FOBS ICBM
3.1. Soviet R-36 (8K69, OR-36, R-36orb) Fractional Orbital Bombing System
3.2. Chinese DF-6 (东风六号导弹) Fractional Orbital Bombing System
4. North Korea’s Fractional Orbital Bombing System
4.2. Timeline of Hwasongpho-17 FOBS Test Launches Updated 7 SEP 2023
4.3. North Korean manned spacecraft
4.4 Conclusion


Many have wondered whether the game-changing FOBS weapons could be introduced in the ICBM computer game.

To answer this question, one has to understand that a FOBS weapon will follow 3 phases: first a ballistic trajectory similar to a space launcher, then in the second phase a warhead will be injected into orbit. The third and final step is the reentry over the ground target.
In the ICBM game, it means this unit should first use the mechanics of a ballistic missile then the one of a satellite, and change again to a nuclear missile.

Model of the Hwasongpho-17 FOBS with TEL, in the "Self-Defence-2021" Exhibition at the Three-Revolution Exhibition House held on 11th October 2021 on the occasion of the 76th founding anniversary of the WPK.[web.archive.org]
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CGI rendering of the Hwasongpho-17 FOBS and Hwasong-15 ICBM[web.archive.org]
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3.1. Soviet R-36 (8K69, OR-36, R-36orb) Fractional Orbital Bombing System

The R-36-O was the only orbiting military nuclear weapon ever deployed, although in order to remain legal under international treaties it was a 'fractional orbital' weapon, 18 missiles were operational from 1969 to 1983.



The 8F021 orbiting warhead had the Russian acronym OGCh. It consisted of an 8F673 orbital module, and fixed on top of it the re-entry vehicle.

The 8F673 orbital module was an equipment unit which oriented the spacecraft in orbit and autonomously determined when to make the braking maneuver to bring the re-entry vehicle down from orbit.

The 8F673 orbital module included an inertial navigation system and a radar altimeter which measured the altitude of the orbit and thereby determined when to make the braking maneuver. A solid fuel cartridge then spun up the turbine assembly of the liquid propellant (N2O4/UDMH) braking engine. Orientation was by 4 + 4 thrusters using turbine exhaust gases.

LEO Payload: 1'700 kg to a 150 km orbit. Standard warhead: 1'700 kg. Maximum range: 40'000 km. Number Standard Warheads: 1. Standard RV: 8F021. Warhead yield: 5'000 KT. CEP: 1.10 km. Boost Propulsion: Storable liquid rocket, N2O4/UDMH. Cruise Thrust: 940.400 kN. Cruise Thrust: 95'900 kgf. Cruise engine: RD-252. Initial Operational Capability: 1969.

Stage Data - R-36-O

• Stage 1. 1 x R-36-0-1. Gross Mass: 125'000 kg. Empty Mass: 8'500 kg. Thrust (vac): 2'640.000 kN. Isp: 301 sec. Burn time: 120 sec. Isp(sl): 269 sec. Diameter: 3.00 m. Span: 3.00 m. Length: 18.90 m. Propellants: N2O4/UDMH. No Engines: 1. Engine: RD-251.
• Stage 2. 1 x R-36-0-2. Gross Mass: 48'000 kg. Empty Mass: 5'000 kg. Thrust (vac): 955.991 kN. Isp: 317 sec. Burn time: 160 sec. Diameter: 3.00 m. Span: 3.00 m. Length: 9.40 m. Propellants: N2O4/UDMH. No Engines: 1. Engine: RD-252.

R-36O 8K69[web.archive.org]
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8К69 (SS-9 Mod 3) was the first orbiting military nuclear weapon deployed by the U.S.S.R.[web.archive.org]
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The 1'700 kg 8F021 orbiting warhead had the Russian acronym OGCh。[web.archive.org]
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The 1'700 kg 8F021 orbiting warhead had the Russian acronym OGCh。[web.archive.org]
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Soviet 8F673 orbital module。[web.archive.org]
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3.2. Chinese DF-6 (东风六号导弹) Fractional Orbital Bombing System

The cancelled Chinese DF-6 FOBS ICBM (东风六号导弹) developed starting from November 1966, was made of 3 stages, all burning liquid propellants. The first stage could produce a thrust of 400 tonnes at liftoff, carrying a 3'200 kg orbiting warhead.

The maximum range was 31'000 km, the length 45 m, the total mass 270 tonnes.

The DF-6 was an uprated DF-5.

The DF-6 missile was to carry the first Chinese manned spacecraft Shuguang-1, and the first GEO satellite.

Prototype of the spacecraft and spacesuit were developed, astronaut selection process also started.

First launch of the spacecraft was expected by 1975.


The program was cancelled on 28 March 1974, due to economic difficulties.

Originally posted by baike.baidu.com:

Disclosing China's Dongfeng 6 missile: with range three times that of the Dongfeng 41, project ultimately cancelled

May 31, 2018 10:16 Sina Military

In China's ballistic missile family, intercontinental missiles have always been the most mysterious and attracting the most attention.

Among the models that have been disclosed so far, the heaviest is the Dongfeng-5B liquid intercontinental strategic nuclear missile.

The Dongfeng-5 ballistic missile was developed by China in the 1970s, but what is less known is that China was preparing to develop a missile named Dongfeng-6.

Dongfeng-6 was a three-stage liquid missile with a staggering maximum range of 31'000 kilometers, a total length of 45 meters, and a maximum take-off weight of 270 tons.

The multi-warheads FOBS ICBM was underground silo-launched.

In that era, this kind of missile with a range of tens of thousands of kilometers had a proud name: Orbiting Missile (环球导弹).

As early as the 1960s, the Soviet Union had been equipped with an Orbiting Missile, which was the R-36O, an improved R-36 missile (NATO codename SS-9).

The missile had a launch weight of 181 tons, a diameter of 3.05 meters, and used liquid fuel.

Compared with other types of R-36 missiles, the missile mainly had an added third-stage, which could send a warhead into the earth's orbit, heading toward the southern hemisphere after passing the south pole, and attack from the south where the United States did not have a missile warning system at the time.

The R-36O has a maximum range of 40'000 kilometers. It began to be deployed in 1968. Since then, it has been tested twice a year to show the United States that the Soviet Union had the capability to use this missile and also verify its reliability.

Perhaps it is precisely because of the Soviet Union's Orbiting Missile that China decided to develop such class of intercontinental ballistic missile in the last century. Stimulated by the Soviet R-36O, China also devised its own Orbiting Missile plan.

This was the Dongfeng 6 mentioned at the beginning of the article.

In December 1966, the National Defense Science and Technology Commission agreed to include the Dongfeng-6 in the development plan.

In November 1967, the National Defense Science and Technology Commission held a Dongfeng-6 Orbiting Missile program demonstration meeting, which clarified the main tactical and technical specifications.

At the same time, the Dongfeng-6 space launch vehicle plan for carrying the first manned spacecraft Shuguang-1 (Dawn-1:曙光一号) of the country's along the first geosynchronous orbit satellite was planned.

A lot of technical coordination works were conducted many times.

In 1970, the National Defense Science and Technology Commission proposed to Premier Zhou Enlai and the Central Military Commission the Request for Instructions on the Development of Manned Spacecraft and Communication Satellites (Draft), and proposed the Shuguang-1 manned spacecraft (code name 714 project) with place for two astronauts, and flight time up to eight days in orbit. The plan was scheduled for the first unmanned spacecraft to be launched in 1973 and the maiden manned spacecraft in 1974.

The launch vehicle of the Shuguang-1 was to be the Dongfeng-6 Orbiting Missile.

In 1971, the Seventh Ministry of Machinery reported the Preliminary Development Plan for Dongfeng-6 to the National Defense Science and Technology Commission.

In this plan, it was clear that the range of the Dongfeng-6 would be 16'000 to 31'000 kilometers.

However, when the Dongfeng-6 missile was developed, the technical specifications proposed and the related technologies planned to be adopted were too advanced.

The plug nozzle engine belong to a class of altitude compensating nozzles, such a new class of engine planned to be used then has not even entered actual use until today.

Dongfeng-6 was a three-stage rocket. The first stage used a conventional 400-ton high-thrust engine, the second stage used an altitude compensating nozzle engine, and the third stage was a post-boost vehicle.

Each stages of this three-stage rocket used different rocket engines, making technical challenges too difficult.

By investing more time on the DF-6, it would have definitely affected the development of the equally important Dongfeng-5.

On 28th March 1974, the Seventh Ministry of Machinery informed the First Academy that, according to the instructions of the Deputy Director of the National Defense Science and Technology Commission Qian Xuesen, the National Defense Science and Technology Commission decided to stop the development of the Dongfeng-6.

Prior to this, the development of the Shuguang-1 manned spacecraft project had also begun to slow down.

In fact, Dongfeng-6 is not an intercontinental missile in the traditional sense, but a FOBS (Fractional Orbital Bombing System) missile system, also known as an Orbiting Missile.

FOBS is usually on standby on the ground, and when used, it is launched into earth orbit. After the rocket second stage is separated, according to ground instructions, the retro-rockets of the PBV are fired sending it into a deorbiting orbit into the atmosphere.

Because it only achieves a fraction of a complete orbit before reentering the atmosphere, it is called a fractional orbital bombing system.

However, if the development of the Dongfeng-6 project had the conditions to continue, it should still be able to succeed.

After all, in terms of overall technical level, the Dongfeng-6 is equivalent to an uprated version of the Dongfeng-5.

Even if it did not place nuclear warheads in orbit, it could have been used in civilian manned spaceflight.

If the development of the Dongfeng-6 had not been cancelled, China's first manned spaceflight would not have taken place only in 2003, but 25 years earlier.

https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E4%B8%9C%E9%A3%8E%E5%85%AD%E5%8F%B7%E5%AF%BC%E5%BC%B9
http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/jssd/2018-05-31/doc-ihcikcev2746712.shtml

The Shuguang-1 (Dawn One) manned spacecraft (code-named Project 714) was piloted by two astronauts and had a maximum flight time of eight days. It was planned to launch an unmanned spacecraft in 1973 and a manned spacecraft in 1974. The Shuguang-1 was launched by the Dongfeng-6 Orbiting Missile.[web.archive.org]
2[archive.vn]

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Originally posted by amateur:

Peeking under the shroud of North Korea’s Monster Missile

November 5, 2020

Some unresolved questions surround the huge new mobile missiles that North Korea showed off in last month’s parade. Most of all: what will they carry, and when will the North Koreans reveal it through flight-testing?

Let’s start with what we can observe. The external characteristics of the weapon are consistent with a two-stage, liquid-propelled ICBM. In many ways, it’s similar to the Hwasong-15, which North Korea tested in 2017, but on a larger scale. My CNS colleagues estimate that the new missile is about 25 m long, compared to the roughly 20 m-long HS-15. It has a first stage of about 2.4 m [3 m] in diameter, compared to the approximately 2.1 m [2.4 m] diameter of the HS-15.

Like the HS-15, the Monster Missile features a “skirt” at the base of its first stage, suggesting a cluster of gimbaled engines, and an evocatively named “shroud” over its payload section at the front. That’s a hollow cover that pops off after the missile leaves the atmosphere, allowing whatever the missile carries to deploy.

As Mike Elleman and Vann van Diepen were quick to observe, the HS-15 already appears capable of sending a heavy payload to anyplace on the mainland of these United States. It follows that the new missile wasn’t built for greater range, but to carry a bigger, heavier payload. Which means… what?

Even before the parade, veteran intelligence analysts Markus Garlauskas and Bruce Perry noted that the logical next step for the North Korean ICBM program would be to deploy multi-warhead missiles in order to thwart U.S. missile defenses. Ensuring that North Korea’s nuclear weapons can penetrate the American “shield” may be what Kim Jong Un meant when he said in 2017 that “our final goal is to establish the equilibrium of real force [or “effective balance of power”] with the U.S. and make the U.S. rulers dare not talk about [a] military option for the DPRK.”

The U.S. pioneered the multiple reentry vehicle (MRV) concept in the early 1960s, followed by the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV). The Soviet Union caught up with their own versions within a decade or so. You could think of MRV as nuclear grapeshot, spraying a handful of bombs across one area. MIRV is more precise and more adaptable; it involves a small rocket engine called a post-boost vehicle, or “bus,” that pushes each warhead it carries onto a selected course, sending them to different targets if desired.

Some combination of multiple warheads and missile-defense countermeasures–chaff, decoys, and so forth–has become the favorite in this morbid little guessing game. If they’re ambitious, perhaps the North Koreans might be trying to replicate Britain’s Chevaline payload, which was designed to let its Polaris missiles thwart nuclear-tipped interceptors placed around Moscow. Chevaline was a two-warhead system with a post-boost vehicle that dispensed countermeasures into various patterns in space. It’s also rather well-documented today, as these things go.

There’s another possibility that I’ve yet to see explored at length, though. Let’s call it a dark horse. It’s another approach to beating missile defense, and one that requires a heavy payload, but no more than a single warhead per missile. That’s the fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS).

FOBS was a Soviet innovation, brought to fruition in the mid-1960s, before the USSR developed its own multiple-warhead missiles. It involved a modified ICBM that launched its payload into low earth orbit. When the payload approached its target, an onboard retro-rocket would fire, deorbiting the warhead.

The advantage of FOBS was its ability to circumvent NORAD’s lines of early-warning radars in Canada. The FOBS weapon could be launched in any direction, allowing the USSR to launch an attack over the South Pole if desired.

Today’s early-warning radars don’t just provide warning; they also supply crucial data to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD). These radars are located in Alaska, Greenland, the UK, California, and Massachusetts, pointing north, west, and east, whereas the interceptors themselves are mostly in Alaska, waiting for an attack from the north. Thus, the same old FOBS concept remains applicable. It’s even enjoying new life in Russia, whose president has said that the Sarmat multi-warhead missile can attack over either the North or the South Pole.

With the ability to attack in FOBS mode, North Korea could compel the United States to an unhappy choice: either build what amounts to a substantially new, south-facing defensive architecture, or accept that it cannot physically prevent nuclear attack from Pyongyang, even under the sunniest of assumptions about GMD’s performance.

Even if North Korea is building a FOBS today, its leaders probably anticipate a transition to MIRV in time, following the Soviet precedent. But FOBS could have certain advantages for now. First, the technology simply might be more rapidly attainable. Second, sticking with just one warhead per missile demands less fissile material. Third, it also avoids creating pressure to return to nuclear testing to demonstrate the smaller, lighter warheads most suited to MRV or MIRV. Fourth, being able to deorbit a payload essentially anywhere means that North Korea could finally conduct a fully realistic and instrumented test of an intercontinental-class reentry vehicle on its own territory, or close to its own shores; they’d just have to fly one all the way around the world.

There’s an uncomfortably large chance that we’ll find out soon what the Monster Missile hides under that shroud. A transition to a Biden administration on January 20, 2021 gives Kim Jong Un an incentive to try to demonstrate the existence of an “effective balance of power” beforehand, since it might strengthen his hand without directly challenging the newly inaugurated president. Kim Jong Un has set the 8th Workers’ Party Congress for January as well; the success of a “new strategic weapon”–either real success or merely alleged–could set the stage for changes in governing structures and the direction of policy.

Whatever does happen, I can’t see any benefits from sitting back and waiting for North Korea to demonstrate the ability to overcome GMD by whatever means. That will mean bargaining for the reaffirmation of Kim Jong Un’s April 2018 pledge not to test long-range missiles or nuclear devices, which he declared a dead letter in January of this year. How that will work will be up to the new team in Washington, but the sooner they decide on their approach, the better.

https://web.archive.org/web/20211006042156/https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1210289/north-koreas-new-icbm-whats-under-the-shroud/

4.2. Timeline of Hwasongpho-17 FOBS Test Launches

1. 27 FEB 2022: Reconnaissance satellite test launch 1[web.archive.org]2[archive.ph]
2. 05 MAR 2022: Reconnaissance satellite test launch 1[web.archive.org]2[archive.ph]
3. 16 MAR 2022: Unpublished 1[web.archive.org]2[archive.ph]
4. 24 MAR 2022: Hwasongpho-17 Test Launch 1[web.archive.org]2[archive.ph]
5. 25 MAY 2022: Unpublished
6. 03 NOV 2022: Undisclosed
7. 18 NOV 2022: Hwasongpho-17 test launch 1[web.archive.org]2[archive.ph]

Source: Namuwiki[web.archive.org]2[archive.ph]

Note: Dystopian henchmen operatives of the U.S. military junta getting evermore undisguised in their moves against the truth and aimed at preventing the sheeple from ever receiving any valuable education, have falsified the dates posted above via hack. It says a lot about the most valuable critical information they don't want you to know. The edit posted above has now been reverted from vandalism on 24th November 2022.

Depending from the sources, the 4th May 2022 test could have been another unpublished related ICBM component test; launched at 12:03 KST, from Sunan.

First officially reported Hwasongpho-17 test launch

KCNA report “Striking Demonstration of Great Military Muscle of Juche Korea: Successful Test-Launch of New-Type ICBM. Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Test Launch of ICBM Hwasongpho-17,” 24 March 2022

Pyongyang, March 25 (KCNA) -- The test-launch of a new type inter-continental ballistic missile Hwasongpho-17 of the DPRK strategic forces was conducted on March 24, Juche 111 (2022) under the direct guidance of Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and supreme commander of the armed forces of the DPRK.

The respected Comrade Kim Jong Un gave a written order to conduct the test-launch of the new type ICBM of the DPRK strategic forces on Wednesday. He visited the launch ground on Thursday and personally guided the overall process of the test-launch of the new type ICBM Hwasongpho-17.

With his deep insight into the ever-changing international political situation, the root cause of the daily-escalating military tension in and around the Korean peninsula and the long-term demand of our revolution that stems from the inevitability of the long-standing confrontation with the U.S. imperialists accompanied by the danger of a nuclear war, the General Secretary put forward the Juche-oriented defence development strategy and the policy of bolstering in a sustained way the nuclear war deterrence at the historic 8th Congress of the WPK. Organizing and directing the crucial endeavors for bolstering the national defence capabilities to implement the strategy and policy, he, with top priority given to the development of the new-type ICBM in particular, provided detailed guidance and directions almost every day and made sure that the Hwasongpho-17 type weapon system, a symbol of Juche power and fruition of self-reliance, was completed as a core strike means and a reliable nuclear war deterrence means of the DPRK strategic forces.

Fully armed with his original idea on self-reliant defence strategy, officials, scientists and technicians in the field of national defence scientific research and the heroic workers in the munitions field, under his direct guidance, vigorously waged a research and development campaign with creative wisdom and unyielding mentality, thereby producing the new-type ICBM in a short time.

Kim Jong Un learned in detail about the preparations for the test-launch of the weapon at first hand on the spot on Thursday afternoon and gave an order to advance to the launching position.

He went to the launching position and gave detailed guidance until the last process of the launch, giving strength and courage to the defence scientists and missile maintenance crew involved in the launch to bring about a momentous time when the epochal development of the defence capabilities of the country would be demonstrated all over the world.

It was ready for the test launch, and the moment of a historic event has come.

The launching ground counting down to the test-launch of the huge strategic weapon was seething with the ardent anticipation of all the defence scientists and munitions workers to inform the whole world of the production of another powerful nuclear attack means by Juche Korea and to demonstrate with pride the reliable DPRK's nuclear war deterrent force.

After the General Secretary entered the general launch control center together with leading officials in the field of defence science research, a combat alarm for the launch was sounded at the launching site, test observation technical posts and relevant test research institutes.

Then the launch order given by the General Secretary reached the firepower sub-unit and the commander of the Red Flag Company entrusted with the test-launch shouted the command "Fire!".

That moment, brightening flame heated the earth along with a loud boom and the huge entity representing the invincible power of the DPRK soared into space.

The test launch was carried out in a vertical launch mode in consideration of the security of neighboring countries.

The missile, launched at Pyongyang International Airport, traveled up to a maximum altitude of 6 248.5 km and flew a distance of 1 090 km for 4 052s before accurately hitting the pre-set area in open waters of the East Sea of Korea.

The test-launch clearly proved that all the parameters of the weapon system exactly met the design requirements and that its prompt operation can be guaranteed scientifically, technically and practically under wartime environment and conditions.

The new type weapon system to be operated by the strategic forces of the DPRK under a plan for building up the state nuclear force will creditably perform its mission and duty as a powerful nuclear war deterrent of putting under strict control the nuclear war threats and challenges against the DPRK, taking the initiative to cope with any military crisis and defending the security of the country.

Kim Jong Un remarked with pride that the emergence of the new strategic weapon of the DPRK would make the whole world clearly aware of the power of our strategic armed forces once again, adding that the event would be an occasion of convincing the world of the modern feature of our strategic forces and further consolidating the foundation of guarantee and confidence in security of the state based on it. He stressed that the successful development of the new type ICBM, a complex of ultra-modern defence science and technology, is a striking manifestation of the might of our independent defence industry that started and developed by our own strength.

He said that this miraculous victory is a priceless victory won by the great Korean people who have unconditionally upheld our Party's lines for building up the self-reliant defence and the nuclear force while pooling their efforts for the security of the country and the eternal well-being of the future generations despite all kinds of difficulties.

Noting that steadfast is the strategic choice and determination of our Party and government to keep bolstering the powerful nuclear war deterrence qualitatively and quantitatively so as to ensure the security of the country and cope with all kinds of potential crises in the future, he remarked that to equip with incomparably superior military attack capabilities means possessing the most reliable defence capabilities exemplified by a war deterrent. The DPRK would as ever focus all state efforts on bolstering the defence capabilities on a top priority basis, he said, declaring that this is the resolution made by our Party for the national dignity, sovereignty and peace and for the eternal well-being of the country and the future generations and a noble choice made by our people themselves.

He said that any forces should be made to be well aware of the fact that they will have to pay a very dear price before daring to attempt to infringe upon the security of our country. He stressed that our national defence forces would possess formidable military and technical capabilities unperturbed by any military threat and blackmail and keep themselves fully ready for long-standing confrontation with the U.S. imperialists.

He affirmed that the strategic forces of the DPRK are fully ready to thoroughly curb and contain any dangerous military attempts of the U.S. imperialists.

He had a photo taken with the combatants of the Red Flag Company and major defence science officials who contributed to demonstrating the high strategic position of the DPRK to the world.

All the defence scientists, who came to enjoy the greatest love and trust under the care of the General Secretary at a significant moment of strikingly demonstrating the tremendous strength of the country to the world, pledged to develop more invincible nuclear attack means for the country, the Party and the respected General Secretary in the future, too.

The absolute power, the invincible nuclear war deterrence for self-defence can be secured only by the great WPK and the great Korean people.

This powerful nuclear force of justice possessed by the great WPK and the great Korean people will reliably defend the victorious advance of our revolution and the eternal well-being of the future generations by humbling the U.S imperialists and their vassal forces showing off their military edge. -0-

www.kcna.kp (Juche111.3.25.)

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Second officially reported Hwasongpho-17 test launch

WPK Solemnly Declares Its Immutable Will to React to Enemy's Nuke and Full-frontal Confrontation in Kind
Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Test-fire of New-type ICBM of DPRK's Strategic Forces

Pyongyang, November 19 (KCNA) -- The DPRK strategic forces test-fired a new-type ICBM on Nov. 18 amid the strict implementation of the top-priority defence-building strategy of the Workers' Party of Korea and the DPRK government on steadily bolstering up the most powerful and absolute nuclear deterrence.

The test-fire was conducted under the intolerable condition that the reckless military confrontational moves of the U.S. and other hostile forces persistently driving the military and political situation in the Korean peninsula to the red line have gone beyond the limit and hypocritical and brigandish sophisms have been justified even in the UN arena to brand the right of a sovereign state to self-defence as provocation in every way.

Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the DPRK, guided the test-fire on the spot.

Jo Yong Won, Ri Il Hwan, Jon Hyon Chol, Ri Chung Gil, Kim Jong Sik and other senior officials of the WPK Central Committee watched the test-fire in the presence of the respected Comrade Kim Jong Un.

Kim Jong Un was greeted on the spot by Col. General Jang Chang Ha, leading officials in the national defence scientific research sector and commanding officers of the Red Flag Company.

The test-fire was aimed at checking the reliability of the weapon system and its operation.

The new-type ICBM Hwasongpho-17, launched at the Pyongyang International Airport, traveled up to a maximum altitude of 6 040.9 km and flew a distance of 999.2 km for 4 135s before accurately landing on the preset area in open waters of the East Sea of Korea.

The test-fire clearly proved the reliability of the new major strategic weapon system to be representative of the DPRK's strategic forces and its powerful combat performance as the strongest strategic weapon in the world.

Encouraging the successful test-fire, Kim Jong Un said he came to confirm once again that the nuclear forces of the DPRK have secured another reliable and maximum capacity to contain any nuclear threat.

The recent dangerous situation in which the U.S. and other hostile forces' military threats get ever more undisguised around the DPRK more urgently requires it to substantially accelerate the bolstering of its overwhelming nuclear deterrence, he pointed out.

Stressing the need to show more clear action under the present situation in order to make the U.S., south Korea and other vassal forces be aware that the military counteractions against the DPRK lead to their self-destruction and they have to reconsider a wise choice to improve their security environment, Kim Jong Un said that our Party and government should clearly demonstrate their strongest will to retaliate the hysteric aggression war drills by the enemies seeking to destroy peace and stability in the Korean peninsula and the region. Then he stated that the more the U.S. imperialists make a military bluffing in the Korean peninsula and its surrounding area while being engrossed in "strengthened offer of extended deterrence" to their allies and war exercises, the more offensive the DPRK's military counteraction will be.

Kim Jong Un solemnly declared that if the enemies continue to pose threats to the DPRK, frequently introducing nuclear strike means, our Party and government will resolutely react to nukes with nuclear weapons and to total confrontation with all-out confrontation.

Referring once again to our Party's defence-building strategy for steadily bolstering up the nuclear strategic weapons, he urged the national defence scientific research sector to put more vigorous spurs to the development of Juche-based strategic weapons of Korean-style and the ICBM units and all the units for the operation of tactical nukes to intensify their training with high vigilance so as to perfectly discharge their important strategic duty in any situation and at any moment.

All officials and scientists in the sector of the national defence science and combatants of the strategic nuclear weapons units vowed to absolutely worship and remain intensely loyal to Kim Jong Un who came out to the site for the historic major strategic weapon test-fire, a crucial milestone in bolstering up the nuclear forces of the DPRK, together with his beloved daughter and wife, to personally guide the whole course of the test-fire and warmly encourage them and showed the road of eternal victory, giving greater strength and courage in the dynamic advance for bolstering up the state nuclear strategic forces. And they hardened their determination to accelerate the building-up of the DPRK's powerful strategic forces in the future, too, and seize more tightly the nuclear weapons to defend the Party and the revolution, the country and the people forever. -0-

www.kcna.kp (Juche111.11.19.)

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▲ Hwasongpho-17 ICBM TEL. 18 NOV 2022[web.archive.org]
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▲ Hwasongpho-17 ICBM Liftoff. 18 NOV 2022[web.archive.org]
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Video
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B6VWOVPGPhU
▲ Youtube video: Kim Jong Un and his daughter guide test firing of the new ICBM Hwasongpho-17. Nov 19, 2022[archive.ph]
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▲ Geolocation for the recent North Korean ICBM test (39.22168° N, 125.67428° E) · Nov 18, 2022[archive.ph]
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▲ Slightly refined orbit of -6256 x 6100 km x 41.6 deg with impact near 137.2E 41.8N · Nov 18, 2022[archive.ph]
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Japan Mod confirms North Korea ICBM splashdown within EEZ after 69 minute flight (10:14 > 11:23 JST (01:14 >02:23 UTC)). 1[archive.ph]2[archive.ph]3[web.archive.org]

The Hwasongpho-17 is the largest road-mobile liquid-propellant missile ever designed and tested anywhere, so the North Koreans set a record of a sort with this successful flight-test. (Nov 18, 2022) 1[archive.ph]2[archive.ph]3[web.archive.org]

Hwasongpho-17 Mod 1 vs Hwasongpho-17 Mod 2

My current breakdown of major visible changes between March 24th 2022 HS-17 and ICBM HS-17 Mod 2 tested on November 18th ..
1. Shorts first stage.
2. Wider interstage between stage 1 and 2.
3. Improved 2nd stage with new thrusters added into base.

▲ Major visible changes between March 24th 2022 HS-17 and ICBM HS-17 Mod 2 tested on November 18th 2022. · Nov 19, 2022[web.archive.org]
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Ionospheric disturbances caused by HSP-17 ICBM test launch

Ionospheric disturbances caused by an HSP-17 ICBM launched from North Korea on 18th November 2022 were investigated by using the GPS total electron content (TEC). The spatial characteristic of the front edge of V-shaped disturbances produced by missiles and rockets was first determined.

▲ Ionospheric disturbances induced by a missile launched from North Korea on 18 November 2022.[web.archive.org]
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Key Points

• Clear V-shaped disturbance related a missile was found in GPS TEC

• The disturbance propagated faster than acoustic wave

Introduction

At a rocket or space shuttle launch, acoustic waves are generated in the atmosphere and lower ionosphere [Fehr, 1967]. Donn et al. [1968] attributed the generation mechanism to either the disturbances created by the gaseous exhaust stream or the object's supersonic motion. Based on GPS Total Electron Content (TEC) observations, Calais and Minster [1996] found that the acoustic waves excited during the ascent of a space shuttle consist of a high-speed shock wave front and a series of low-speed oscillatory perturbations, and they explained the latter as guided waves that were excited by the shock front. Pulse-like shock fronts excited by rocket and space shuttle launches have also been reported based on observations using very long baseline interferometry [Li et al., 1994], Doppler sounders [Jacobson and Carlos, 1994], ionosondes [Arendt, 1971], and local GPS networks [Afraimovich et al., 2002]. These observations revealed acoustic waves characterized by horizontal velocities of 600–1670 m s−1 and periods ranging from tens of seconds to 10 min. A maximum propagation range of ~1500 km has been reported [Donn et al., 1968], although in the early days near-continuous observations of their full extent were not routinely obtained.

Recently, the two-dimensional (2-D) spatial variations of acoustic waves excited by ground-based sources such as earthquakes have been observed using densely distributed local GPS networks [Chen et al., 2011; Ogawa et al., 2012]. The wave structures that are excited by the supersonic movement of objects such as missiles and the Moon's shadow have also been analyzed [Liu et al., 2011; Kakinami et al., 2013]. Following the prediction by Chimonas and Hines [1970], that the movement of the Moon's shadow during a solar eclipse would excite a “bow wave” formed by acoustic gravity waves, Liu et al. [2011] used the densely packed local GPS networks of Japan, Taiwan, and the Republic of Korea to observe the acoustic waves generated during a total solar eclipse. They observed the fine structures of both bow and stern waves, which were believed to have been formed by acoustic waves with periods of 3–5 min and which traveled equatorward with a phase speed of ~1000 m s−1. Kakinami et al. [2013] used data from the same networks to analyze the ionospheric disturbances induced by a missile launch. They observed the front edge of V-shaped disturbances moving at a much higher speed than the speed of acoustic waves reported in previous studies.

In this study, we used GPS data organized by the Geographical Survey Institute of Japan (ftp:/terras.gsi.go.jp/), the Central Weather Bureau of Taiwan (http://gdms.cwb.gov.tw/index.php), and the National Geographic Information Institute of the Republic of Korea (http://www.ngii.go.kr/en/main/main.do?rbsIdx=1). All data were recorded every 30 s. The slant TEC was calculated using the phase difference of two L-band (f1 = 1575.42 MHz and f2 = 1227.60 MHz) carriers emitted from GPS satellites. To estimate the observation bias in the TEC, the method employed by Liu et al. [1996] and Kakinami et al. [2009] was used.

Links

In the spirit of OSINT, the code is also open-source (though can be a bit finicky to run) https://github.com/tylerni7/missile-tid
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The data for this test is from https://gsi.go.jp/ENGLISH/geonet

References

Ionospheric disturbances induced by a missile launched from North Korea on 12 December 2012
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Ionospheric response to the shock and acoustic waves excited by the launch of the Shenzhou 10 spacecraft
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How advanced is the Hwasongpho-17 ICBM?

Why do Russian R7-derived rockets (Soyuz) use those oddly asymetrical boosters?

The R 7 family of rockets which includes all flavours of Soyuz were derived from the Soviet R 7 ICBM which itself had wedge shaped boosters initially.

Early conceptual designs for the R 7 had classical cylinders but the conical boosters were chosen primarily for aerodynamic advantages.

For a given volume, cone would have a larger frontal reference area than a cylinder which means more drag but the better drag coefficient of the wedge shaped booster dominates for the advantage.

The same volume cylinder would also be very shorter in length hanging around the second stage tail which is apparently a poor aerodynamic shape.

The conically wrapped booster shape is also attributed to the aerodynamic stability in flight.


Meanwhile all other space powers produce boosters that are cylindrical because they’re cost effective to manufacture.

The boosters are usually identical to one of the core stages making single line production possible.

So why can't the Soyuz use cylindrical boosters? Because unlike most advanced rockets, whose engines can swivel on 2 axis to provide the thrust vector control, the vintage Soyuz attitude and roll control is only assumed by a pair of small verniers on each boosters.

This means the pair of verniers produce only about 10% of the 4 static nozzles' (four-chamber engine) thrust.

Compared this to the 100% of thrust available for an advanced engine that can swivel.


To better illustrate the reason behind the clumsy Soyuz design, the Hwasongpho-17 ICBM had initially a conical skirt added at the bottom part of the missile, which correspond to the engine bay section.

The added drag at the lower part helped in the trial phase to add aerodynamic stability in flight to the missile.

After the trial phase, the conical skirt was removed for a cylindrical engine bay, which produces less drag, hence more range and heavier payload.

|1|[web.archive.org] |2|[archive.ph] |3|[archive.ph] |1|[web.archive.org] |2|[archive.ph]▲ OSINT community has noted the lower section of HS-17 is not flared like prior HS-17 tested but is much more streamlined. Mar 17, 2023

Of course, the mighty 80-tf Paektusan-1D engine series is fully gimballed, and can easily overcome any major aerodynamic instability, unlike the tiny Soyuz vernier engines or Safir-2/Unha vernier engines.

The Safir-2 rocket weigths 85 tons and its liquid fuel propulsion system has a thrust of up to 143 tons. The rocket uses a cluster of four Shahab-3 engines that can't be steered, each having a thrust of 32 tons plus a four steering control engine with a total thrust of 15 tons.

Notice that the Chollima-1 SLV powered by four fully gimballed 80-tf Paektusan-1D engines has no fins at all! Just like SpaceX's Starship.

This speaks volumes.

|1|[web.archive.org] |2|[archive.ph] |3|[archive.ph]▲ Provisional CGI rendering of the Chollima-1 SLV compared to the Hwasongpho-17 ICBM and Unha SLV.


4.3. North Korean manned spacecraft

Obviously as different from the Iranian Kavoshgar-10 capsule as the Paektusan-1 SLV was different from Iran's Safir-1 SLV!

As depicted back in 2017, from a mysterious Japanese account possibly related to Chongryon.

North Korean manned spacecraft: 朝鲜飞船. May 3, 2017 6:58 AM[web.archive.org]
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Iranian 1'800 kg E1 spacecraft： new prototype disclosed in 2016 on the left， first 2015 exhibition model on the right。[web.archive.org]
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North Korean Unha-9 SLV carrying the 1'800 kg one-seater E1 spacecraft (Mallima: “千里马号”（천리마）)， similar to the Project 714 Shuguang-1 spacecraft。[web.archive.org]
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The model disclosed so far by Iran of the E1 is only the reentry vehicle. Because it is the only part to be tested in the first suborbital phase.

Expect a future orbital module to be disclosed only after that, in the phase two when orbital manned flight will be considered, and similar in shape and size to the Soviet 8F673 orbital module!

4.4. Conclusion

In a nutshell, by deorbiting a spacecraft of the size of a nuclear warhead, that is a mass of 1.5 tonnes, and make sure its survives the atmospheric reentry, North Korea would demonstrate its capability to field fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), the only strategy that can currently beat the U.S.' NORAD’s lines of early-warning radars in Canada.

Therefore achieving a credible nuclear deterrence.

This means the quickest the better, an orbital spaceflight by 2024, but a suborbital mission by 2022!

To sum up:

• The launch of the Kwangmyongsong-1 satellite was a mean to test the validity of the Moksong-1 ICBM. Technologies validated: 32-tf thrust Hwasong-7 rocket engine, high altitude rocket nozzle, rocket staging, hot and cold stage separations, orbital insertion, under 50 kg orbital payload, etc..
• The launch of the Kwangmyongsong-2 to Kwangmyongsong-4 satellites were a mean to test the Moksong-2 ICBM. Technologies validated: gimballed steering vernier engines, cluster of 37-tf thrust Hwasong-7 rocket engines, under 500 kg orbital payload, etc
• The launch of the Kwangmyongsong-5 satellite will be a mean to test the Moksong-3 ICBM (aka Hwasongpho-17). Technologies to be validated: multiple fully gimballed 80-tf Paektusan-1D rocket engines, under 2'000 kg orbital payload, etc
• The future launch of the the E1 manned spacecraft will test the reentry vehicle's supersonic atmospheric survival
• And the future orbital insertion followed by deorbiting of the E1 manned spacecraft will test the final missing technology needed for completing a FOBS system

NORAD vs the DPRK FOBS.[web.archive.org]
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Range

No wonder, the range from both Iran and North Korea for an FOBS targeting the U.S.A. mainland from the south direction, after circumnavigating the South Pole and the Southern Hemisphere is 30'000 km. Similar to the DF-6 FOBS.

The range from both Iran and North Korea for an FOBS targeting the U.S.A. mainland from the south direction, after circumnavigating the South Pole and the Southern Hemisphere is 30'000 km. [web.archive.org]
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Trajectories

Preparations for developing FOBS weapons are so advanced, that rockets have been launched by both Iran and North Korea on several occasions, with trajectory heading similar to that of future FOBS missiles.

Indeed, both Iranian Safir-1 and Qased SLVs have placed payloads into orbit, while heading toward the U.S. mainland approaching from the south west.

Meanwhile, North Korean Unha-3 and Kwangmyongsong SLVs have placed payloads into orbit while approaching the U.S. mainland from the south east.

This might be consistent with a probable doctrine of coordinated Irano-Korean nuclear preemptive simultaneous saturation strike, conducted from multiple directions in order to defeat the U.S. missile defence system, and to maximize the probability of success.

Keeping in mind that the doctrine of first use of nuclear strike is inherent to the FOBS weapon, as then devised by the Soviet Union.

North Korea being known to currently possess only less than a hundred nuclear warheads, the addition of at least the same number of Iranian warheads in the near future would be necessary for any preemptive thermonuclear carpet bombing of the U.S.A. mainland to be successful.

Preparations for developing FOBS weapons are so advanced, that rockets have been launched by both Iran and North Korea on several occasions, with trajectory heading similar to that of a future FOBS missile.[web.archive.org]
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