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Relatar um problema com a tradução
If your network has a connection to the internet, then it has a vector for intrusion from outside your local network.
The key-exchange we're talking about here is the exchange between the hardware key / authenticator and the local system on which the user is signing in. This is not an exchange that traverses the internet. There is nothing to MitM unless there is already malware on the local system.
Even then; the exchange between authenticator and local system, and then on through the browser to the service's servers, is still cryptographically secured every bit as well as current-day HTTPS is. Including traits such as forward secrecy, which prevent replay attacks.
In fact, the protocols FIDO uses to secure this exchange were in academic papers mathematically proven to have these secure qualities.
And yes; of course MitM still sporadically happens with HTTPS. For one very simple reason:
When new zero-day security flaws in ciphers and protocols are discovered and are patched out, there's always an old outdated server configuration left around which needs the old version and doesn't support the new. Thus browsers still allow use of old and less secure ciphers and protocol versions so those old servers with outdated configuration, are still reachable. i.e. "Don't break the internet."
That doesn't mean those attacks are still possible with services where operators care about security and have everything properly up-to-date.
Just explained why it is no more hassle than the current solutions. Same amount of user interactions involved.
In case using a phone as an authenticator - the key is stored on the phone. Specifically: the key would be stored in the key-vault that's part of the phone's 'secure enclave' - the dedicated security chip set - which means you pretty much either are authorized to access it, or you need direct hardware access to exfiltrate it.
In case you are using a separate hardware token - the key is stored in the token.
The key is not stored on the system where the user is active trying to sign in.
The only thing that system ever sees is a set of one-time keys derived from the private key. And it doesn't even 'see' those, as that communication is encrypted as well. With a cipher that has forward secrecy qualities, i.e. you can't capture it and play it back to reuse it either.
Citing that passage from the wikipedia page like that is disingenuous. Please cite the full thing, including the "failed verifiability" and "see discussion" markings. The article's discussion page reveals that the original author of that phrase has misinterpreted their source.
Hardware keys, when using the USB CTAP - will indeed operate using the standard Human Interface Device (HID) protocol, which means custom device drivers are not required. That driver is used by device classes such as keyboards; mice; etc. But it does not mean the authenticator 'emulates a keyboard.' At all.
It doesn't need to be a dedicated dongle. It can be a smart phone. Smart phones are hardware keys nowadays. Also; how is this any different from accidentally dropping your phone and having it ruined? You know how that's solved in both cases? Backup authentication means; like a sheet of one-time recovery codes. Like ... Steam already has.
That statement is literally unverified with a "citation needed"
Moreover: your 'translation' is wrong. That's not what malicious manufacturer duplication means. What that term means, is that the manufacturer of the authentication device could theoretically create duplicates if the device operates off of a pre-established private key that is supposed to be kept unique.
FIDO does not operate off of a pre-established private key. The private keys FIDO uses are generated during the initial enrollment when you register the authenticator for use with a particular service.
FIDO authenticators even internally have a monotonic increasing counter for how many times a particular service has been authorized before, which becomes part of the cryptographic exchanges. Which means key-cloning is impossible, because you'd end up with re-used counter values.
In either case; it has nothing, absolutely nothing, to do with criminals tricking users into exporting their private keys. When dealing with physical hardware tokens that isn't even possible without direct hardware access and completely destroying the key in the process. On top of that such hardware tokens are tamper-proofed and trying to get anything out of them is extremely difficult.
And when dealing with a smartphone being used as a FIDO U2F device, the key material lives in its secure enclave. You know; that thing even the FBI had trouble getting into on Apple phones?
Do you see users carefully disassembling their phones or hardware keys to try and lift the key material from them? No. Didn't think so.
I have now created a separate email to steam and changed the API and password
And in the near future, all my accounts (related to my old steam email) have been tried to log in and received verification codes)
It seems that my computer is no longer safe, I need to review my own behavior, don't be dumped again❤️❤️❤️
If that was not you, then it would suggest that someone else has the login credentials
Note that if you ever get a login notification for any of your accounts online, and it wasn't you logging at the said time, then means someone knows your login info, and to fix that so they don't spam login just change password.
For security on your device is important to pay attention what you do online as you don't want to download or install things that you're not sure about as there lots of scammers online that try get people to download things and run it. This is common issue you see related to people trying to get game cheats/hacks, piracy, and so on.
If you got a smart phone I suggest using mobile 2FA instead of email, this makes things little harder for scammers/hijackers so if they somehow got access to your email they wouldn't have access to your other account without access to your mobile 2FA app on your phone, but still you want to boot them off your email change password on it.
since i host it myself only hackers on my wifi can intercept it
If example you compromise your network, or device to giving them said access, they can also access it that way as they can view what you have, and do other things.
Another thing is with private home email network, you have to ensure it's active at all time that you need, or wanting things from services, news, and such. The one thing you have to take note is that you have to make a whitelist, to only allow incoming, if you don't do this, anyone can send you something, remember you're hosting the content it being sent to you, that means anything they send you have already downloaded it from them on your network/device, and if you open it then just hope there no workaround to auto run said content. Just as warning, you have to make your whitelist to be very specifically with no gaps, or loopholes. That why services online take that portion of risk away from the end user.
The other issue I forgot to listed is hijacking traffic, I forgot the correct word for this, but basically if someone knows your email, they be sending non stop to trigger to bud your whitelisted list to try spoof using same email as your whitelisted, it possible to do, and can happen, so something you have to be aware of since you're new to this space, not trying to scare you off from doing this, it to inform you so you have some knowledge on this.
No it public, but it privately hosted by you, if you made it closed only to your network, you won't get emails from what outside your network, hence why your email is public if you want something that outside of your network.
Even my friend got hacked a few months ago, but he admitted it was by phishing. However, he also had steam guard up.
It seems that people have learned how to bypass it entirely.