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Also i think the volksdeutsche weren't volunteers. They said most of the manpower was conscripts.
You couldnt say the SS were all elite or that they were all conscript/2nd line troops.
There's also the question of how we want to define elite: is it training, equipment, structure, veterancy, combat record? On June 4, 1944 would you say that the 101st wasn't elite but the 82nd AB was? Or even before any combat was the 101st elite? Then the British 7th Armor would have been considered elite before normandy with its outstanding combat record, but then during normandy it wouldn't perform very well. So what's that mean?
And what is the standard for being elite? I'd consider the 1st ID an elite American infantry division, but they weren't elite the same way that say the SAS units were. So I think there's just alot of variables to look at to be able to judge.
As far as which SS divisions were elite (what a loaded question), I'd start by saying that most of the SS panzer divisions had moments of being elite during the war. The structure of SS panzer divisions gave them additional size and strength (on paper, clearly this was increasingly rare as the war continued) and the internal politics of the Reich enabled these divisions to often get priority of equipment. Still positions within SS leadership was dependent on party loyalty and politics over real leadership, tactical thinking, ect. Leading to the failure to capitalize on military intellect at higher levels of command. Additionally as the war went on these Divisions were overused, continiously run into the ground, and constantly put in terrible situations. As the war continued this had a compounding effect, especially after the catastrophic twin defeats of Normandy and Bagration. So the 1st SS of 1943 wasn't the 1st SS of June 1944 which wasn't the 1st SS of September '44.
As far as Volksgrendiers: Volksgrendiers were simply German Infantry with nothing particularly special about them as individuals. The difference between Volksgrendier Divisions and the earlier Grenadier/infanterie Divisions was the structure of the two units and the TO&E. That's not to say that the changes made in the Divisional structure of Volksgrenadiers wasn't an improvement (it was, especially given the strategic situation) but in late 1944-45 they weren't really anything more than standard infantrymen that (on paper) had a higher chance of having a Smg. Some were very good others not so much.
The SS divisions never made an official structural change that the infantry divisions did but as the war reached its end they would share qualities with the Volksgrendier Divisions: cores of hardened veterans filled in with raw recruits, conscripts, ect., smaller size while trying to maintain firepower, more automatic weapons, reliance on handheld AT weapons. Most of this was simply out of necessity which was why the Volksgrendier Divisional structure was created as well.
Then they paradropped to assinate Tito. Except intelligence was bad and Tito was much more heavily guarded than they thought. The mission failed from the moments they dropped and the unit was almost completely destroyed. The survivors that escaped would fight on the Eastern Front for the rest of the war but the unit never again reached regiment size.
Well sorta. I wouldn't say necessarily better but different. The Americans especially put training emphasis on physical fitness even for junior officers (trained in programs, not the ones coming out of West Point) while german training was more based around practical combat expereince, and the military education of a German junior officer was much more practical and tactical.
The Germans also were constantly reforming units and creating new units around smaller units of veterans. The veterans would become the NCOs and core of the unit and would be the ones helping to train the troops. The Americans on the other hand would continually pump replacements out of basic training only to be split and sent to front line units. While the Germans trained together and then fought together the American divisions that remained on the front lost that cohesion.
But then there's time. The Allied divisions had months and in some cases years to train prior to Normandy. The Germans however were fighting the Russians on a scale that is frankly unprecedented. As the war went on the Germans had less and less time as the situation became more and more desperate and by the end the standards were out the door. The Americans never felt pressure like this and while the quality of a replacement wasn't at the level of the men that trained in England for Overlord American divisions overall would get more experienced as the war went on.
One added note: a benefit of the Sherman as the main tank was that it had a very high survivability rate if destroyed, so that American Armor units were able to maintain a high level of veterancy.