Trying to understand Chickamauga

[Didz]

As I've mentioned before, I'm English, so I have limited knowledge of the ACW, based mainly on a collection of cigarette cards I owned in my teens and my very early wargaming experience using Airfix plastic miniatures, before I graduated to Napoleonic's. So, basically I've never heard of Chickamauga before in came up in this game.

Furthermore, as a personal rule I don't read up on any battles in my UG:CW campaigns until after I've fought and won them. I'm playing symultaneous campaigns as Umion (BG) and Confederate (COL), so i play each major battle twice and then i usually get my copy of Davies 'Battles of the Civil War' and read up on what really happened to compare my performance with the actual commanders.

So, I played though Chickamauga as the Union and won, and I posted a brief comment on that experience as it was pretty obvious that the developers (who I've begun referring to as 'The Pinkerton's) were trying their usual trick of misleading the player and trying to set them up.

Anyway I won, though in truth even then I was a little confused as to why the battle had been fought and why what I did secured me a victory. But it was over pretty fast so I wasn't too bothered.

Then I started my Confederate play through and things just didn't make any sense at all to me. i really couldn't understand why the Confederacy were fighting this battle, and what value the objectives I'm being told I must capture actually have.

I've still not finished it as to be quite honest I'm not enjoynig it, and unlike the Union one the Confederate verison is really slow and messy. I'm having to play everything in slow motion just to be able to monitor everything thats going on, and even then I'm missing things.

Anyway! To cut a long story short in the end I decided to abandon my rule about not reading up on the battle before I fight it and I've been looking at the history and trying to work out why it was fought and what point all these apparently worthless objectives actually had.

This is what I've discovered so far:
[If like me you're not reading up on battle before fighting them look away now.]

Following the defeat of Bragg's Army of Tennessee at Stones River in January 1863, Bragg withdrew into fotified positions at Tullahoma, Manchaster, and Shelbyville covering the line of The East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad and the approaches to the vital communcations hub at Chattanooga.

Nothing much happened then for months as both sides licked their wounds and avoided each other.

June 23: Rosecrans and the Army of the Cumberland march into Northern Tennessee, but still nothing much happens.

July 4-7: In a brilliant and unexpected move Rosecran's managed to completely outmaneouvre Braggs positions guarding The East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad and Bragg is forced to abandon his fortifications without a fight and retreat to Chattanooga.

Now at this point (looking at the map) The East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad is still open because it actually runs through Chattanooga, Stevenson and Huntsville, which are about 20-30 miles futher South, but Braggs Army is no longer in a position to stop Rosecran's marching south and cutting it.

August 16: With Bragg's Army now holed up in Chattanooga, Rosecran's divides his army into three columns sending McCooks 20th Corps and Thomas' 14th Corps in a wide flanking march to threaten Braggs line of communication with Atlanta. It's not clear but at this point I assume that Rosecran's also cut The East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad, as he would have had to cross it to threaten the road to Atlanta, but none of the books i've looked at confirm this.

Sept 4: Rosecran's army is now threatening Bragg's line of communication with Atlanta, and Bragg seems unable or unwilling to do anything to stop him.

Sept 8: Bragg abandon's Chattanooga and withdraws to the south, presumably concerned that he may be encircled and trapped in the city. Rosecran's (no doubt thanks to the Pinkerton's) is told that he is falling back to Atlanta, via Rome. However, in fact, he has merely fallen back to La Fayette, about 20 mile to the south of Chattanooga and is just sitting there.

Sept 9: Rosecran's Army enters Chattanooga which surrenders without a fight. He then orders a general pursuit of Bragg's Army, which he is still convinced is in disorganised retreat somewhere to the south.

Crittenden's 21st Corps is ordered to push south from Chattanooga towards Rome and Atlanta, whilst still covering the approaches to the city.

Thomas' 14th Corps is ordered to march through Steven's Gap in the Lookout Mountain range (20 miles west of Crittendens Corps) and head for La Fayette.

Whilst McCook's 20th Corps is ordered through Winston Gap, 20 miles further to the west and 40 miles from Crttenden's column.

So, at this point Rosecran's Army is deployed on a 40 mile front and is racing south in extended march columns in pursuit of an enemy everyone has been told is in full retreat towards Atlanta. The main urgency being to catch Bragg's Army before it can reach Atlanta and dig itself in for a protracted seige.

Bragg in the meanwhile is aware of Rosecran's proximity and orders Hill's Corps, supported by Hindeman's Division from Polk's Corps to block the advance of Thomas' Corps at Dug Gap. Whilst the rest of Polk's Corps is ordered to attack Crittenden's Corps, which at that time was approaching Mc Farlands Gap enroute to Lee and Gordon's Mills. Polk's orders were to drive in Crittenden's Corps and retake Chattanooga. Whilst the reinforced Hills Corps dealt with the rest of the Union army.

It was in fact, a brilliant plan, a classic rendition of Napoleon's classic strategy of a maneourve on a central position. And as Thomas freely admitted once he realised what was happening 'Nothing but stupendous blunders on the part of Bragg can save our army from total defeat.'.

Thomas' Corps was, in fact, walking blindly into the middle of the whole Confederate Army still in an extended march column and completely unaware that there were any enemies within 20 miles. The first that Negley's Division leading the advance knew of the enemy proximity was when they opened fire, and even then the natural assumption Negley made, based on the Pinckerton's intellegence was that he had run into a Confederate rearguard, and so he pushed forward aggressively sticking his head well and truly into the noose until his division was pretty much surrounded.

At this point Thomas must have realised that something didn't smell right. He immediately rushed more men forward and managed to extricate Negley from the trap he had sprung, and withdrawing them towards Davis Cross Roads by nightfall

He was lucky, Bragg's orders had been for Hindeman's Division to attack Thomas' flank and completed the destruction of Negley's Division and problably most of Thomas' Corps. But Hindeman had not attacked, and Hill and decided unilaterally with him not to psuh their advantage.

Thomas' Corps was therefore allowed to escape destruction despite Bragg's orders, something for which Bragg later had Hindeman arrested on the grounds that he was guilt of blatant disobedience of orders.

Strangely enough it seems Hill was not arrested although he was equally guilty, and nor was Polk who while all this was going on had actually done nothing despite the fact that his part in the plan for the 9th was probably the most important one, in that he was supposed to be reecovering Chattanooga, and so threatending Rosecran's Lines of supply and communication. But in fact, Polk simply ignored Bragg's orders completely and did absolutely nothing all day, his Corps did not move an inch, either to help Hill or defeat Crittenden, and so the amazing strategic advantage that Bragg had was simply thrown away.

Sept 10-12: Amazingly all was not lost. Because Rosecran's still hung onto the foolish beleif that the Confederate Army was in full retreat and that the bloody nose that Thomas' Corps got on the 9th was just a meeting with a strong rear guard.

Part of the reason he probably still beleived this was that nothing much had happened. Polk's Corps had not even been seen by Crittenden who had marched unopposed to Lee and Gordon's mill, and Hindemans Division had not made an appearance, so basically Negley had stumbled into Hill's Corps which had given him a fright, but not really tried to stop him falling back to Davis Cross Roads.

So, from Rosecran's perspective the Confederate Army were indeed bahaving like a small rearguard, and he was probably expecting it to fall back as soon as the main body it was protecting had cleared La Fayette.

The surprising thing is that during that two days when Rosecran's was still confused,Bragg's Army apparently just sat and did nothing. The union army was still spread over a 40 mile front, nothing had changed and nobody moved. Historians seem completely at a loss to explain what Bragg and his officers were doing in this 48 hours. They basically had Rosecran's at their mercy and just failed to deliver the killing blow,

Sept 12: Eventually the truth dawned on Rosecrans and he realsied that his army was in danger of being completely destroyed if Bragg decided to do anything. He immediately ordered his Army to concentrate, Ordering McCook and Crittenden to march immediately to concentrate on the centre and join Thomas.

Sept 18: For another six whole days Bragg sits on his hands and does nothing. It has now been eight days since the confrontation between Thomas and Hill at Dugs Gap. Giving Rosecrans ample time to move McCooks Corps north to join Thomas and then to move both Thomas and Mc Cook's Corps north to join Crittenden at Lee and Gordon Mills, In fact, Thomas' Corps marches even further north behind Crittenden's Corps and deploys 2 miles closer to Chattanooga. Perhaps because Rosecran's can't beleive the Confederates are doing nothing, and is worried that they might actually be trying to slip around his left and recapture the city.

Sept 19: Finally a full 10 days after the battle began at Dug Gap Bragg wakes up and decides to do something. By now of course every advantage he had achieved by surprising Rosecran's has been lost, and the Union army is concentrated and ready to fight. Not only that but Bragg now decides to do exactly what Rosecran's is expecting him to do and to try and turn his left flank and cut his army off from Chattanooga.

The problem being that Bragg still thinks that Crittendens Corps at Lee and Gordons Mill is Rosecran's left flank, because presumably the ever efficient Polk either hadn't noticed, or hadn't bother to tell Bragg that Thomas had now extended the Union battle line for two whole miles further north, and so when the attack goes in, led by Polk. (Who for some reason continues to be given responsible, if not critical roles, despite repeatedly proving himself incompetent) And as expect Polk blunders about like a floundered fish, bumping into union units and providing zero, if not negative leadership to his men. Such that even the Union officers present notice that the Rebs don't seem as aggressive as usual and wonder if they are losing their will to fight.

Nevertheless, the battle drags on indecisiveley for two days and racks up a hug butchers bill just on the basis of duration and ammunition expended before in the end the Union Army quits the field and withdraws into Chattanooga, essentially still denying it to the Confederates despite all the opportunites they had to retake it since the 9th.

So, that's what I've gathered really happened.

What still puzzles me is how the scenario in the game bears any resemblance to that actual history.

My personal view is that this battle should start on September 9th, with the battle a dug's gap and Polk's attack on Crittenden. That would actually make sense and give the player the chance to correct history for the Confederacy. The battle would then proceed through the subsequent phases of dealing with the Arrival of Thomas's and McCooks Corps and the recapture of Chattanooga. Which to be fair was ctually in Braggs plan. Instead we don;t get to start the battle until the 19th, after all the advantages Bragg secured had been wasted , and we are being forced to play out a repeat performance of fubar that followed.

I'm still trudging my way through what I think is the second day of the battle (The Breakout phase?) and I'm being ordered to capture and hold random cabins and roads for no apparent or obvious reason other than the fact that they are there.

So, Although I think I now have a better understanding of the history of this battle, I'm still puzzled as to how that actually has any relevance to what I'm being asked to achieve in the game.

[Caramirdan]

Most of your nice narrative is of the events leading to the Battle of Chickamauga, including the offenses of Bragg's subordinates which allowed the Union to escape.

From the website Civil War Trust's Battle of Chickamauga[www.civilwar.org]:

After the successful Tullahoma Campaign, Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans continued the Union offensive, aiming to force Gen. Braxton Bragg’s Confederate army out of Chattanooga. Through a series of skillful marches towards the Confederate-held city, Rosecrans forced Bragg out of Chattanooga and into Georgia. Determined to reoccupy the city, Bragg followed the Federals north, brushing with Rosecrans’ army at Davis’ Cross Roads. While they marched on September 18th, his cavalry and infantry skirmished with Union mounted infantry, who were armed with state-of-the-art Spencer repeating rifles. Fighting began in earnest on the morning of the 19th near Chickamauga Creek. Bragg’s men heavily assaulted Rosecrans’ line, but the Union line held. Fighting resumed the following day. That afternoon, eight fresh brigades from the Army of Northern Virginia under Lieut. Gen. James Longstreet exploited gap in the Federal line, driving one-third of the Rosecrans’ army, including Rosecrans himself, from the field. Only a portion of the Federal army under Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, staved off disaster by holding Horseshoe Ridge against repeated assaults, allowing the Yankees withdraw after nightfall. For this action, Thomas earned the nickname “the Rock of Chickamauga.” The defeated Union troops retreated to Chattanooga where they remained until late November. Chickamauga is known as one of the bloodiest battles in the Western Theater.

The game's battle scenario is confusing, but I think it's intentional to show the fog of war. It's one of my personal favorites for the openess of what you can actually do. Playing the Union, do you seek out and destroy the CSA hiding in the woods? Playing the CSA, do you attack the far right and roll up the Union using LaFayette Road? Sooooo many options and a huge field for it too. I find carbine cavalry effective here, to scout and neutralize stragglers especially.

To really get a feel for this battle as it was, I suggest playing the HIstorical Battle of each side. Really, I think everyone should do this for all the battles before going in to campaign, as there's nothing but pride gained/lost winning/losing the Historical Battles, and much experience to be gained learning the game and its battles.

Edited to add: Roads (and railroads), especically crossroads, are humongous strategic objectives.

[Didz]

Well I think the issue I have with the battle as scripted is that it forces the player to play out the pointless part of the battle, after Bragg and his officers had already thrown away every advantage they had and were just trying to half-heartedly save face by getting 21,000 or their men killed to no purpose,

The battle in the game would actually make a lot more sense if it at least gave the player the option of playing one of the two perfectly good plans that Bragg actually came up with, but lacked the leadership ability to execute.

Namely, defeating the Union Army in detail by attacking when he had the advantage of a central position and could destroy each column in detail before they could concentrate. e.g. starting on Sept 9th with the attack on Negley's Division and then playing through the systematic destruction of Thomas' Corps; Crittenden's Corps and finally McCooks Corps, and perhaps ending with the truimphant liberation of Chattanooga.

Or, if the design team were absolutely determined to recreate the incompetence of Bragg's command and control failures, then at least let the player have a go at carrying out Bragg's desperate Plan B.

e.g. 'Outflank the enemies left and ninja Chattanooga, before the Union Army can get to it.'

That was a much inferior plan, not least of all because it would have left the Union Army intact and basically returned the strategic situation to the exact same status as it was on 9th September, when Bragg decided to abandon the city in the first place.

Except that now the Union Army was concentrated rather than spread over a front of 40 miles on the 9th when he decided it was too scary to fight.

But at least the player would have a chance to see what might have happened if Polk was not in charge of the Confederate Right wing, which would actually make the battle a little bit more interesting.

As it is I've wasted another couple of hours of my life trudging through the 'Breakouit' phase of the battle. With absolutely no idea what I'm breaking out of, or even if it's me whose supposed to be breaking out. I've captured yet another pointless ford that I actually didn't need yo use (thats three unnecessary fords I've had to capture so far.) as I was already over the river. In fact, I attacked the dumb-arsed Union ford defenders from behind as they were guarding a pointless crossing point. And of course I've wandered aimlessly through even more woods to capture insignificant fields and log cabins etc. along a road that the Union troops don't seem to be using anyway.

I now have the joy of another 3 hours of mucking about waiting for Longstreets Corps to turn up, even though I don't need him as I've already captured every pointless point on the map, but the battle won't end unless I hang about and wait for him.

Definately the low point of the Confederate Campign to date, in my opinion A really badly crafted scenario. I just hope it's not a portent of things to come, because obviously i'm about to step beyond the realms of real history into the realms of the 'what if' and really I'm hoping the scenario designers have given it a bit more thought than they did this battle.

[cromagnonman2k]

I'm not entirely sure why Bragg hesitated, though I assume it had something to with figuring out what had gone wrong on the 9th and how to incorporate Longstreet's Corps. I think he attacked on the 18th forward thinking that he had Rosecrans's men strung out and tired, and wanted desperately to achieve whatever victory he could. This was only a few months after Chancellorsville, and maybe he though that heavy forests would be his friend.

[Didz]

Originally posted by cromagnonman2k:

I'm not entirely sure why Bragg hesitated, though I assume it had something to with figuring out what had gone wrong on the 9th and how to incorporate Longstreet's Corps.

That 9 day period of inactivity from the 9th to the 18th is one of the mysteries of this whole sorry affair. The historians whose accounts I've read (MacDonald and Davis) don't seem to have any explanation to share and just gloss over it. But basically Bragg had the Union Army totally by the balls, and as Thomas admits 'Nothing but stupendous blunders on the part of Bragg can save our army from total defeat.' all he had to do was squeeze, but instead of destroying it in detail he did nothing for 9 days and let Rosecran's simply march out of the trap.

That's not the only mystery I failed to find any answers to in my limited library (and the internet sources) there are loads of them, and the histories I've read so far seem to just ignore most of them.

For example Polk just completely ignored Bragg's orders to attack Crittenden on the 9th, he didn't even bother coming up with an excuse like Hindeman and Hill, he just ignored them,and yet despite the fact that he had basically betrayed his commander, and the entire Confederate cause, and should in theory have been arrested and shot on the spot. Bragg actually entrusted him with command of half his army on the 18th, and not just the latrine detail but the most important part of his army with the vital role outflanking the Union left and capturing Chattanooga.
WHY!!!!! (Why would Bragg do that,was he completely mad?)

Another minor mystery that doesn't get explained is why it took McCooks Corps from September 12th to Sept 18th (6 days) to march 20 miles and close on Thomas' Corps. I can only assume that he must have taken the scenic route as even if he only marched 8 hours a day thats an actual a speed of under 750 yards per hour. A snail could march faster.

Rosecran's I can sort of forgive for being confused. He was after all told that Bragg was running away again like a little girlie with his tail between his legs, and when you have such reliable intelligence which is backed up by past behaviour (after all this was the third time Bragg and his army had run away) then its easy to beleive that he's behaving true to his nature. And it has to be said that Bragg's army on the 9th didn't actually behave like an army that was spoiling for a fight (apparently Crittenden didn't even realise he was supposed to be under attack.) So, I'm not surprised it took Rosecran's 2 days to work out that the force that attacked Negley on the 9th was more than just a weak rear guard but an entire army.

Nevertheless I am a bit confused why he didn't do the obvious thing and withdraw back the way he had come. Again there is no explanation as to Rosecran's logic in trying to concentrate his army in the face of the enemy. Under any normal conditions that would have led to disaster, its one of the top 'Never! Never! Never! DO THIS rules in the Generals how not to get creamed handbook' just after 'Never enter into a land war in China.!'

If Bragg had done anything, other than nothing, Rosecrans Army would have been destroyed and only problem Bragg would have had was what to do 50,000 Union prisoners. So, why didn;t he just fall back through the Steven's and Winston Gap's dropped off a rear guard to block any pursuit and marched back to Chattanooga along the same roads he used to leave it?

[Caramirdan]

Originally posted by Didz:

Originally posted by cromagnonman2k:

I'm not entirely sure why Bragg hesitated, though I assume it had something to with figuring out what had gone wrong on the 9th and how to incorporate Longstreet's Corps.

That 9 day period of inactivity from the 9th to the 18th is one of the mysteries of this whole sorry affair. The historians whose accounts I've read (MacDonald and Davis) don't seem to have any explanation to share and just gloss over it. But basically Bragg had the Union Army totally by the balls, and as Thomas admits 'Nothing but stupendous blunders on the part of Bragg can save our army from total defeat.' all he had to do was squeeze, but instead of destroying it in detail he did nothing for 9 days and let Rosecran's simply march out of the trap.

That's not the only mystery I failed to find any answers to in my limited library (and the internet sources) there are loads of them, and the histories I've read so far seem to just ignore most of them.

For example Polk just completely ignored Bragg's orders to attack Crittenden on the 9th, he didn't even bother coming up with an excuse like Hindeman and Hill, he just ignored them,and yet despite the fact that he had basically betrayed his commander, and the entire Confederate cause, and should in theory have been arrested and shot on the spot. Bragg actually entrusted him with command of half his army on the 18th, and not just the latrine detail but the most important part of his army with the vital role outflanking the Union left and capturing Chattanooga.
WHY!!!!! (Why would Bragg do that,was he completely mad?)

Another minor mystery that doesn't get explained is why it took McCooks Corps from September 12th to Sept 18th (6 days) to march 20 miles and close on Thomas' Corps. I can only assume that he must have taken the scenic route as even if he only marched 8 hours a day thats an actual a speed of under 750 yards per hour. A snail could march faster.

Rosecran's I can sort of forgive for being confused. He was after all told that Bragg was running away again like a little girlie with his tail between his legs, and when you have such reliable intelligence which is backed up by past behaviour (after all this was the third time Bragg and his army had run away) then its easy to beleive that he's behaving true to his nature. And it has to be said that Bragg's army on the 9th didn't actually behave like an army that was spoiling for a fight (apparently Crittenden didn't even realise he was supposed to be under attack.) So, I'm not surprised it took Rosecran's 2 days to work out that the force that attacked Negley on the 9th was more than just a weak rear guard but an entire army.

Nevertheless I am a bit confused why he didn't do the obvious thing and withdraw back the way he had come. Again there is no explanation as to Rosecran's logic in trying to concentrate his army in the face of the enemy. Under any normal conditions that would have led to disaster, its one of the top 'Never! Never! Never! DO THIS rules in the Generals how not to get creamed handbook' just after 'Never enter into a land war in China.!'

If Bragg had done anything, other than nothing, Rosecrans Army would have been destroyed and only problem Bragg would have had was what to do 50,000 Union prisoners. So, why didn;t he just fall back through the Steven's and Winston Gap's dropped off a rear guard to block any pursuit and marched back to Chattanooga along the same roads he used to leave it?

"Truly, you have a dizzying intellect."
- The Dread Pirate Roberts

[mikec_81]

Originally posted by Didz:

Originally posted by cromagnonman2k:

I'm not entirely sure why Bragg hesitated, though I assume it had something to with figuring out what had gone wrong on the 9th and how to incorporate Longstreet's Corps.

That 9 day period of inactivity from the 9th to the 18th is one of the mysteries of this whole sorry affair. The historians whose accounts I've read (MacDonald and Davis) don't seem to have any explanation to share and just gloss over it. But basically Bragg had the Union Army totally by the balls, and as Thomas admits 'Nothing but stupendous blunders on the part of Bragg can save our army from total defeat.' all he had to do was squeeze, but instead of destroying it in detail he did nothing for 9 days and let Rosecran's simply march out of the trap.

I decided to just ignore the intial post since I thought I had already lectered at lenght about judging Bragg too harshly but I guess I didn't get through the first time. Truly your arrogance knows no bounds.

Let me reiterate. You are sitting here with the benefit of 100% accurate intelligence on enemy positions, numbers, and intentions 150+ years after the battle. You, unlike Bragg, have a complete intelligence situation painted for you with nothing in doubt. This was not the case for Bragg. You also ignore any and all operational and logistical considerations and think armies can march to and from with total ignorance of the supply situation and potential routes of retreat should battle go against them.

He was not idle for those 10 days like you accuse him of. For one, Bragg did not have the disposition of the Army of the Cumberland. He knew he had small segement isolated at McLemore's Cove / Davis crossroads and ordered an attack which was not carried out. He knew there was some number of troops to his North after he surrerendered Chattanooga and he learned of McCook's Corp operating to his South West after Sept 13th.

So from your position as Bragg, what do you know? You have some 50,000 combat effectives after Johnstone sends Breckenridge's 6 brigades to reinforce you after the fall of Chattanooga against a Federal force which you are reasonably sure outnumbers you (Rosecrans had 62000 effectives) given no news of any major formations having departed the Army of the Cumberland.

Looks an awful lot like an attack on both flanks to me? So what does he do? He begins a redeployment of his forces that WERE supposed to attack Negly at Davis Crossroads and begins to concentrate them back up the Lafayette road while keeping an eye on McCook's Corps which could carve in behind him. Meanwhile he moves his rail stock which contains the majority of his food and ammunition up from Rensaca which was closer to Lafayette (remember he intended to fight there starting with Negly's division being crushed) north to Ringold in prepration to move against Chattanooga before Rosecrans could unify.

So no he wasn't sitting still on his hands. Armies and supplies takes a painfully long time ot move in the mountains of Tennesee and North Georgia.

Originally posted by Didz:

That's not the only mystery I failed to find any answers to in my limited library (and the internet sources) there are loads of them, and the histories I've read so far seem to just ignore most of them.

If you know you have a limited library yourself, then why are you rushing to make judgement. You still know very little about the logisitcs and operational movements leading up to the battle yet despite this, you feel ready to pronounce judgement.

Originally posted by Didz:

For example Polk just completely ignored Bragg's orders to attack Crittenden on the 9th, he didn't even bother coming up with an excuse like Hindeman and Hill, he just ignored them,and yet despite the fact that he had basically betrayed his commander, and the entire Confederate cause, and should in theory have been arrested and shot on the spot. Bragg actually entrusted him with command of half his army on the 18th, and not just the latrine detail but the most important part of his army with the vital role outflanking the Union left and capturing Chattanooga.
WHY!!!!! (Why would Bragg do that,was he completely mad?)

That attack was supposed to happen on the 13th. Forrest's cavalry told him of Federal movements towards Gordon's Mill late on the 12th and he told Polk to attack at first light.

You are also an idiot if you think you can fire your subordinates outright just becuase you are the commanding General. It doesn't work like that during a time and era in which seniority and honour were paramount considerations. A dismsal has be approved by people on mulitple levels including the President of the Confederacy. Davis was no friend of Bragg in this case and having just attempted to allievate the problems inside the command structure by sending William Hardee away, it was unlikely that Bragg could get a senior general like Polk fired in short order. Davis was however, a close friend to Polk. What are the odds Davis would authorize such a move?

This wasn't just a Confederate thing. Even in the North when you failed, you were usually not replaced outright. Even a figure like Daniel Sickles can't just be fired. The only way Meade could remove him from command was to dismantle his Corps after he was wounded at Gettysburg before he recovered from his wounds so there was no command for him to take over.

Originally posted by Didz:

Another minor mystery that doesn't get explained is why it took McCooks Corps from September 12th to Sept 18th (6 days) to march 20 miles and close on Thomas' Corps. I can only assume that he must have taken the scenic route as even if he only marched 8 hours a day thats an actual a speed of under 750 yards per hour. A snail could march faster.

What would you have him do? March straight north towards Lafayette into a possible concentrated Confederate Army? The same force that was supposed to destroy Negly 2 days ealier? He had to backtrack up Winston's Gap, almost back to the Tenesse river, and then move through Steveson's Gap, the same route Negly took when he was almost destroyed.

Consider what an Army Corp has with them when they are marching. They not only have men, but they have miles and miles of wagon trains for food and ammunition that trails them. They have miles of artillery trains. This is not just 20,000 men that can stop, turn and move on a dime.

They are also marching over hilly terrain with winding paths. There were no paved roads, just dirt trails that were called roads back in those days. Those roads turned to mud during the rain especially when you has 20000 men marching back and forth on them with another 5000 animals hauling heavy carts.

Originally posted by Didz:

Nevertheless I am a bit confused why he didn't do the obvious thing and withdraw back the way he had come. Again there is no explanation as to Rosecran's logic in trying to concentrate his army in the face of the enemy. Under any normal conditions that would have led to disaster, its one of the top 'Never! Never! Never! DO THIS rules in the Generals how not to get creamed handbook' just after 'Never enter into a land war in China.!'

Just like how Bragg didn't have the complete disposition of the Federal army, Rosecrans' didn't have a complete disposition of Bragg's army. He immeidately moved Crittenden south to Gordon's Mill within supporting distance of Thomas's new position. McCook, once through to Stevenson's gap would be close enough to unify the army on short notice.

You are correct that the safer play was to just effect a total withdrawl back across the Tennesse and surrender Chattanooga back to Bragg. You can imagine how well that would have gone over if it turned out later that Bragg didn't intend to force battle. Especially since Lincoln and Halleck had threatened repeatedly to sack Rosecrans since they found him too inactive.

Originally posted by Didz:

If Bragg had done anything, other than nothing, Rosecrans Army would have been destroyed and only problem Bragg would have had was what to do 50,000 Union prisoners. So, why didn;t he just fall back through the Steven's and Winston Gap's dropped off a rear guard to block any pursuit and marched back to Chattanooga along the same roads he used to leave it?

Stop living in your fantasy land. Expand your library and read up on the actual events of what happened rather than pass judgement based on severely limited information. While you are at it, take a moment to understand logistics.

[cromagnonman2k]

Rosecrans's options were pretty limited, as the terrain and logistics were both pretty terrible. When suddenyl confronted by an enemy whose size he didn't know, concentration was a much safer choice than retreating by separate routes.

Bragg certainly made some mistakes. He also suffered from a lot of interpersonal difficulties with his subordinates, a lot of which was his fault and a fair amount theirs. Polk was pretty bad, but Bragg didn't have the ability to get rid of him.

[Didz]

Originally posted by cromagnonman2k:

I'm not entirely sure why Bragg hesitated, though I assume it had something to with figuring out what had gone wrong on the 9th and how to incorporate Longstreet's Corps. I think he attacked on the 18th forward thinking that he had Rosecrans's men strung out and tired, and wanted desperately to achieve whatever victory he could. This was only a few months after Chancellorsville, and maybe he though that heavy forests would be his friend.

Yeah! I have a vision of him having a 9 day temper tantrum and sulk. But even I find that hard to beleive. Apparently, he did have Hindeman arrested for failing to obey his orders, so he obviously wasn't a happy bunny.

From what I've read Bragg seems to have been an intelligent and highly professional officer, but based on the personal views I've read he seemed to be like many men who have gained promotion on the basis of their technical ability (in Bragg's case as an artillery officer) in that he knew his job but was not a people person and was fatally lacking in leadership skills. He certainly wasn't respected and apparently most of those around him despised and hated him. I can't imagine trying to manage a project under those circumstances let alone command an army.

Originally posted by mikec_81:

I decided to just ignore the intial post since I thought I had already lectered at lenght about judging Bragg too harshly but I guess I didn't get through the first time. Truly your arrogance knows no bounds.

I appreciate that you are far more knowledgeable on the ACW than I am, and so I am grateful when you share some of that knowledge with the rest of us. If the roles were reversed and we were talking about the 1815 Campaign in Belgium, I would be happy to do likewise.

What I'm not so keen on is the 'go read a book' style comments you seem to like making. I've already made it clear that the ACW is not my main area of interest, and so given a choice between buying a book on the Napoleonic period and one on the ACW I will always opt for the former.

All I'm really trying to do here is understand why I'm being asked to fight what seems to be a pointless battle. The Confederate version of this battle is without doubt the low point so far in my Confederate Campaign, as it basically makes no sense. So, I'm trying to understand why I'm being forced to fight it by asking people who have more knowledge than I do to explain why this battle was fought, what it achieved, and why the script for this battle in the game seems so senseless.

I'm really sorry if that annoys you for some reason, so please feel to ignore me.

[wrenchman.rk]

Yes. The confederate failure to achieve the objectives they needed to doesn't fall solely on Bragg. In addition to the fore mentioned Polk and Hill instances, there was even problems with Longstreet. Longstreet was too confident in his own abilities or something because he also screwed the pooch in this battle. After that one push into the gap, he pretty much stopped performing. On the last day when Thomas was defending the Horseshoe ridge, Longstreet's troops were supposed to be attacking, but rather than lead his men Longstreet is having breakfast.

[wrenchman.rk]

That being said, it seems this post has digressed from a conversation of the battle in game to criticizing generals 155 years after the fact.

[Didz]

I've just been looking at some more of the primary evidence related to Bragg's lost opportunity to defeat the Union army on September 9th. This being some of the communications exchanged between the Confederate commanders in the field.

Sept 10th (The day after first contact with Negleys Division)
6am From Bragg to Hindman 'Crittenden's Corps marched from Chattanooga this morning in this direction, and it is highly important that you should finish the movement now going on as rapidly as possible.'

7:30am From Bragg to Hindman 'The enemy is now divided. Our force at or near La Fayette is superior to the enemy. It is important now to move vigorously and crush him.'

These two messages seem to show that Bragg had a pretty clear grasp of the strategic situation and the advantage he held over the Union Army. But was having trouble getting commitment from his frontline commanders to follow his orders.

Hindman to Bragg copied to Hill (Not time stamped) 'Whether the main body has moved or not I am yet unable to determine, but hope to learn to-night. If it has, our attack ought and will be made. If it has not, my force will probably be insufficient, and will be attacked in rear from Stevens Gap while attacking the column going east.'

It's difficult to comment on this report without knowing when it was sent, and i don;t have that information. But given that the column he was being ordered to attack was eminating from Steven's Gap it's hard to understand why he was worried about being rear flanked from the same direction. He seems at this point to be confused as to his position and that of the enemy he is being ordered to attack, either that or he is deliberately seeking to confuse others.

11:30pm Bragg moves his HQ forward to La Fayettee 'to secure more prompt and decided action in the movement ordered.' (bit late if you ask me)

11:45pm Bragg's HQ to Hindman 'General Bragg orders you to attack and force your way through the enemy to this point at the earliest hour that you can see him in the morning. Cleburne will attack in front the moment your guns are heard." Not the most lucid order but the point in question was Dug Gap.

Sept 11th Bragg rides out to Dug Gap to oversee the execution of his orders in person.
Cleburne reported that he was 'waiting the opening of Hindman's guns to move on the enemies flank and rear.' Nothing happened several dispatch officers were sent to Hindman to urge him to begin his attack with 'promtness and vigor' and returned.

3pm Bragg to Hindman 'Time is precious. The enemy presses from the north. We must units or both must retire. The enemy is small force in line of battle in our front, and we only wait for your attack."

3pm Hindman to Bragg reporting that 11,000 Federal soldiers were closing on his position 'General Buckner and Anderson concur, and they also with me that any farther advance would be imprudent.' He goes on to inform Bragg that he is retreating his force to La Fayette via Catlett's Gap.

General Martin commanded a cavalry division observing the Union positions in McLemore's Cove, and was near the positions occupied by Hindmans Division he reported that 'Hindeman's troops were in good position to attack and were eager to do so; i cannot now, nor did I then understadn why he failed to move.'

General Manigault later wrote of Hindmen 'he was not up to the work, it being far beyond his capacity as a general.....the whole affar proved a miserable failure, although had there been a proper man to manage for us, i have little doubt but that a most brilliant success would have been achieved. '

8pm Bragg to Polk 'You must attack at day dawn tomorrow.'

Later same evening Bragg General Order to all officers 'The enemt is approaching from the south, and it is highly important that you attack in the morning should be quick and decided. Let no time be lost.' The deperation in this message is quite clear.

8pm Polk to Bragg '...the whole of Crittenden's corps, with Wilder's cavalry brigade. confronting me and moving in line of battle......I am, therefore, clearly of the opinion that you should send me additional force, so as to make failure impossible, and great success here would be of incalculable benefit to our cause.'

Sept 13th Bragg rides to Lee and Gordon Mills to personally view the situation facing Polks Corps. He found Polk sitting idly in his works with no sign of the enemy nearby. Crittenden realsiing his corps was over exposed had withdrawn to the west bank of Chickamauga Creek and Polk had just let him go.

Contemporary accounts state that by now Bragg was physically and mentally exhausted having had little sleep for several days and having spent most nights travelling between commands or reading the multitude of incoming reports trying to keep track of events.

++++
However, what these message extracts do show is that for four days after the first clash with the head of Thomas' Corps at Dug Gap, Bragg was rushing back and forth trying everything he could to get his officers to follow orders and deliver the coup de grâce to the Union Army. That at least accounts for part of nine wasted days between Sept 9th and 19th. It also gave Rosecran's the two days he needed to release the dire situation his army was in and the chance to avoid the trap before the final event kicked off on the 19th.

[Didz]

Originally posted by wrenchman.rk:

Yes. The confederate failure to achieve the objectives they needed to doesn't fall solely on Bragg.

True! but as I often remind my project managers, the buck always stops with you. If you can't command the respect of your team and get them to deliver then step aside and let someone else take over.

Eventually of course Bragg did exactly that resigning and being replaced by Johnson.

Originally posted by wrenchman.rk:

That being said, it seems this post has digressed from a conversation of the battle in game to criticizing generals 155 years after the fact.

Yes! Although that in part is because in my opinion the sceanrio in the game is actually the wrong battle. In my opinion the Confederate Campaign ought to follow the strategy formulated by Bragg on the 9th Sept when he had the strategic advantage and was trying to expliot it.

The reason the Confederate scenario in the game doesn;t make sense is because by the 18th that advantage had already passed and the battle that followed didn't make sense.

If the game had begun the Confederate battle on the 9th and stepped through the fight a Dug's Gap and Lee and Graham Mills then it would be a really interesting a sensible battle.

As far as the current script is concerned I've been trudging through this battle for about a week now, and I've finally got to the bit where i have to sit on my hands and wait for Longstreet to appear. I'm not sure why, as I've already captured every flag on the map, but apparently I'm not alolowed to win until he turns up.

I just hope this is the past phase, and I can consign this battle to history where it belongs.

[wrenchman.rk]

But that wasnt the battle of chickamauga... That was part of the campaign leading up to it. If the game began the battle on the 9th, anyone could win it with ease. We dont deal with subordinates not listening. If you noticed, the game doesnt make the union make that blunder (moving Woods or the brigades next to Woods leaving the large gap) that Longstreet was able to exploit either. Just as you dont have to deal with the same type of situation on malverne hill ( in real life, CSA couldnt acheive victory due to inaction by multiple generals not following orders.)

[Didz]

Originally posted by wrenchman.rk:

But that wasnt the battle of chickamauga... That was part of the campaign leading up to it. If the game began the battle on the 9th, anyone could win it with ease. We dont deal with subordinates not listening. If you noticed, the game doesnt make the union make that blunder (moving Woods or the brigades next to Woods leaving the large gap) that Longstreet was able to exploit either. Just as you dont have to deal with the same type of situation on malverne hill ( in real life, CSA couldnt acheive victory due to inaction by multiple generals not following orders.)

True! But at least it would have made sense as a battle, there was a reason for the Confederates to fight on the 9th-12th because they had the advantage, and as a player I'd rather fight a 'what if' version of the battle that makes perfect sense than a simulation of a fubar that doesn't. That's pretty much the whole point of being a wargamer after all. I don't think the hobby would last long if the purpose was to recreate historical ♥♥♥♥-ups. It's more about 'what would have happened if Napoleon had reinforced Ney, when he asked.

I mean I had no real problems with the Union play-through because it was crafted to try and con the player into making the same mistakes the Union commanders made on the day and avoid the consequences. So, it was basically about self-preservation and fending off the enemy until you could escape the trap. It made sense even though the objectives were arbitrary.

Looking back on it now having read some of the history, i think it wold have made more sense if the objective had been to extricate your army from the field along the La Fayette Road to the north without losing X% casulaties in the process. But at the time I sort of got the message that my army had been caught with its pants down due to poor intelligence, and that this was basically a survival mission.

This battle only became really frustrating when I came to it again as the Confederates, and at first I just couldn't work out why I was fighting the battle. The objectives seemed to be completely arbitrary and tactically valueless especailly the fords in the south, and the timer just seemed to be deliberately set to force me to bum-rush everything and waste my mens lives trying to get to them.

It was that frustration at not understanding why I was being made to do what I was being told to do that eventually led me to break my own personal rule and read up on the actual battle. I thought it would explain things.

Instead if anything it's its merely convinced me that the Confederate scenario for this battle is badly crafted.

It certainly doesn't reflect Braggs original plan for the battle, which was perfectly brilliant and would have given him a stunning victory. Nor as far as I can see does it reflect his Plan B, which whilst desperately formulated and lacking all the strategic advantages would at least have made some sense. Smashing Crittendens Corps and turning the federal left flank, cutting the La Fayette Road and forcing Rosecran's to try and break out by fighting his way trhough the entire Confederate Army lacked the strategic advantages of the initial plan, but would have forced the Federals to attack at a tactical disadvantage.

But the game scenario doesn't actually reflect that. If anything it seems obsessed with forcing the player to fragment his army all over the map and aggressively waste his manpower in desperate attacks to capture pointless objectives against the clock. Also the player is drip fed his units for no apparent reason other than to make the battle as hard as possible.

If we have to fight Braggs Plan B, then why not make the scenario reflect what it was, instead of the ford obsession. Give the player his entire army and tell him his job is to prevent the AI getting more than say 50% of its army off the map to the north along La Fayette Road. then its up to the player to decide which fords he needs to capture and where to attack or defend.

You could even try and repeat the poor intelligence by suggesting that Crittenden's Corps is the Union left flank and nearest to the line of escape. It won't fool anyone whose read about the battle, but it might have fooled me a week ago.

That would make Chickamagua an interesting battle at least, rather than just a boring mess.

++++
Well I managed to finish it at last. Longstreet never turned up, so I must have misunderstood what the last phase was about. It just seemed to involve more killing.
http://steamcommunity.com/sharedfiles/filedetails/?id=1130924912
Some of my brugades are down to under 20% effectives, and whilst I killed much more of them than they did of mine that doesn't count for much in this game. So, a bit of a waste really.

[Caramirdan]

Originally posted by Didz:

Well I managed to finish it at last. Longstreet never turned up, so I must have misunderstood what the last phase was about. It just seemed to involve more killing.

I've never seen Longstreet turn up either, but I assume that if the Union or CSA doesn't hold all of the objectives when the timer expires, Longstreet shows up to rout the Union to Horseshoe Ridge.

Some of my brugades are down to under 20% effectives, and whilst I killed much more of them than they did of mine that doesn't count for much in this game. So, a bit of a waste really.

Sounds like a tactical problem.