Just a question about the Radio Officer.

[cretedog]

Is there a mod or an implementation planned for the sim to allow the radio officer to contact other Uboats to assist in an attack on a enemy convoy. Surely they did this in WWII. Would be a cool addition to the sim instead of the three choices we now have?

[ramjbjb]

No, it wasn't done in WW2. German Uboats kept almost constant radio contact with BdU, but not with other boats. In fact, one of the weaknesses of the german wolfpack system was that uboats part of a wolfpack would be called into action by BdU but once unleashed and ordered to attack a target convoy, they weren't coordinated in their attacks in any way.

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Originally posted by ramjbjb:

No, it wasn't done in WW2. German Uboats kept almost constant radio contact with BdU, but not with other boats. In fact, one of the weaknesses of the german wolfpack system was that uboats part of a wolfpack would be called into action by BdU but once unleashed and ordered to attack a target convoy, they weren't coordinated in their attacks in any way.

I see this over and over again on these online threads but if you read the U-Boat commander's handbook, you will see that u-boats communicated with each other both before and during attacks on convoys.

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As per the Submarine Commander's Handbook 1942:
https://maritime.org/doc/uboat/index.php#par391

"Contact Holders."

383.) Without prejudice to its own attack, the "contact holding" submarine must use every means of maintaining contact with the target, following it, regaining contact if lost. It is on the skill and resolution of the "contact holder" that success depends more than on anything else.

Transmission of messages by "contact holders": see Nos. 314 and 315

C. How to deal with Convoys.

310.) The most important task within which the submarine is faced on sighting enemy convoys is to attack them, and to endeavor to repeat the attack again and again. The submarine must not allow itself to be shaken off. If it is temporarily repulsed or forced to submerge, it must continue to press on, again and again, in the direction of the general course of the convoy, seek to contact it, and renew the attack.

311.) In keeping contact with convoys, and carrying out the attacks, no attention should be paid to consumption of fuel, provided that enough fuel is saved to enable the submarine to return to its base.

312.)

a) On sighting convoys and other important objectives, in order that these may be attacked by other submarines as well, the submarine should report the sighting immediately, even before attacking itself, and send further reports confirming the contact, in the intervals between its attacks on the enemy ships.

b) Failing orders to the contrary, the most important thing always is to attack. Each submarine should be concerned primarily with carrying out its own attack. Exceptions, for example, for boats whose task it is to maintain the contact with the convoy, must be in accordance with orders from Headquarters.

c) For the information of other boats, the intention to attack should be communicated by short signals according to the "Short Signal Book," pages. 1, 4 and 83.

The possible disadvantage of warning the enemy by these wireless messages is bound to be less serious than when, as a result of the omission of the messages, other submarines fail to contact the targets at all.

313.) The success, or otherwise, of the attacks of all the other submarines operating against the convoy depends on the skill of the first submarine, whose duty it is to keep the contact with the convoy.

314.)

a) The essential contents of the reports must always be: Position, course, and speed on the enemy. Type, strength, and distribution of the enemy covering forces, and the state of the weather should be reported later to supplement these messages. Attention should be paid to the conditions of visibility and the resulting possibilities of error in estimating the distance for the reports on the position of the enemy.

b) Try to ascertain the general course of the enemy as soon as possible, from the reckoning, and report it as such (see Section II, B, No. 115).


315.) While carrying out its own attack, the submarine must transmit regular and complete contact reports, according to the following headings:

a) The two first boats to make contact, acting as "contact holders," transmit complete hourly reports.

b) As long as the two first boats transmit contact reports, the other boats signal "made contact!" once only, as soon as they have reached the convoy, or, analogously, "lost contact!", using short signals in both cases.

c) If a "contact holder" fails to send reports for longer than 1 hours, another boat must take over. This must be done without waiting for orders.

d) If a "contact holder" loses contact, it must report as soon as possible the last position of the enemy, and his course and speed.

e) All boats which have been in contact with the convoy, and lost ground in consequence of their long stay underwater, or have been driven off, must also report their own position.

B. System of Command.

342.) The distribution and grouping of the submarine, and the operational and tactical command, is ordinarily in the hands of the submarine Command ("B.d.U.").

Groups.

343.) If there is a considerable number of submarines, a subdivision in "submarine groups" may be made.

Group Commanders.

344.) When group commanders are appointed for this purpose by the Submarine Command, they assume the tactical direction of their groups. If no group commanders are appointed, the tactical command of the individual groups remains in the hands of the Submarine Command.

If a group commander is prevented from giving orders, and does not appear on the scene, his duties are taken over by the Submarine Command, unless a substitute has been specially appointed.

345.) The tactical command of the group commanders should be limited to taking steps to relocate the enemy, when contact has been lost; for example, by organizing reconnaissance or advance patrols.

The group commanders must send in a report to the Submarine Command, when the situation is such that it cannot be taken in by the command on land.

346.) An order issued by the Submarine Command overrides an order by a group commander.

I would say, if the first two subs on target are contact holders (according to the submarine commander's manual), and contact holders are supposed to transmit complete contact reports including: position, course, speed, composition of the enemy (to include type strength and disposition), along with weather reports, and they both are expected to do this every hour (and if both contact holders don't send these regular messages, another boat is supposed to take over and send the same information), each boat that made contact with the target was expected to send a message they had made contact, they sent messages signaling their intent to attack, and were required to send messages with their position and that they had lost contact if they lost contact with the target... That sounds to me like a lot of communicating.

[ramjbjb]

Yep, I know what the manual says.

I also know what happened in real life. Which is different from what the handbook says. Wolfpack with group commanders were tried in 1939-early 1940. The results were a disaster to say the least. For reference, look up for Hartmann's and Rösing wolfpacks just to name two instances.

Operationally ,thereafter, wolfpacks were formed, moved and ordered around by BdU and once the attack order was issued, it was "anything goes" for the boats involved. If you review the many convoy battles with wolfpacks involved since mid 1940 onwards, you'll see there was absolutely no concert or sincronization between on-site uboats at all.

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Originally posted by ramjbjb:

Yep, I know what the manual says.

I also know what happened in real life. Which is different from what the handbook says. Wolfpack with group commanders were tried in 1939-early 1940. The results were a disaster to say the least. For reference, look up for Hartmann's and Rösing wolfpacks just to name two instances.

Operationally ,thereafter, wolfpacks were formed, moved and ordered around by BdU and once the attack order was issued, it was "anything goes" for the boats involved. If you review the many convoy battles with wolfpacks involved since mid 1940 onwards, you'll see there was absolutely no concert or sincronization between on-site uboats at all.

I'm not saying to give step by step instructions for an attack to other uboats...

but it would be beneficial to receive short messages of other boats that have acquired the target convoy, and short messages signaling their moving to attack, or have fallen back and lost contact with the target... Just little things like that create the sense of working together while still doing your normal thing.

[ramjbjb]

Originally posted by XIIIOpsec:

I'm not saying to give step by step instructions for an attack to other uboats...

but it would be beneficial to receive short messages of other boats that have acquired the target convoy, and short messages signaling their moving to attack, or have fallen back and lost contact with the target... Just little things like that create the sense of working together while still doing your normal thing.

That's what I'm trying to tell you. Those things you ask for, weren't done since mid-1940, and for a very good reason. Coordinating uboat attacks on the spot was proven far from possible with the equipment and technology of the time, even with designated "wolfpack leaders" trying to act as communication hubs to coordinate the efforts of the uboats present.

So the system was changed and from then onwards what happened was that, as soon as a submarine detected a convoy, it would signal BdU about it, BdU would designate it as the founding of a wolfpack and signal nearby uboats to join. Those uboats would radio BdU when they joined the pack. Once enough boats had been mustered for an attack BdU would radio the order to attack, and from then on it was a free for all with no communications involved at all.

What you're asking is not how uboats operated, at all. Sorry, it's the way it is.

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Originally posted by ramjbjb:

That's what I'm trying to tell you. Those things you ask for, weren't done since mid-1940, and for a very good reason. Coordinating uboat attacks on the spot was proven far from possible with the equipment and technology of the time, even with designated "wolfpack leaders" trying to act as communication hubs to coordinate the efforts of the uboats present.

So the system was changed and from then onwards what happened was that, as soon as a submarine detected a convoy, it would signal BdU about it, BdU would designate it as the founding of a wolfpack and signal nearby uboats to join. Those uboats would radio BdU when they joined the pack. Once enough boats had been mustered for an attack BdU would radio the order to attack, and from then on it was a free for all with no communications involved at all.

What you're asking is not how uboats operated, at all. Sorry, it's the way it is.

That uboat commander's handbook is dated 1942 and if you read the KTBs, while it doesn't log down every radio transmission received, most of them make note about contact keepers and whether they were still broadcasting.
That uboat commanders handbook, is no different than today's Infantryman's Bible, if it's in there... that's the way it was done, because those are the regs.

[ramjbjb]

No, that's not the way it was done, regardless of what that handbook says, that's not how wolfpacks operated, that's not how BdU ordered them around ,and that's not how U-boat commanders attacked convoys.

It's how it was intended to be done, but after the early war attempts to put it at work and the resulting fails (and I even gave you the names of the wolfpacks where it was tried), that doctrine was abandoned and substituted.

You keep on saying otherwise. Ok. Prove it. Bring it here any instance of any wolfpack attacking a convoy post June 1940 doing anything but what I described. Bring quotes from german commanders explaining how they called other boats during convoy battles. Bring HF/DF reports from allies coming from submarines contacting anything other than BdU. Bring Blechley Park decripts of communications between uboats.

Bring any of that, if you can. But gonna tell you right now, you won't be able to. Because the way wolfpacks operated is the way I described. Not what the handbook says.

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Spend time reading the KTBs...
https://www.uboatarchive.net/U-96/KTB96-6.htm
U-96
2 Aug 1941 - 12 September 1941

BDU forms multiple Uboat groups operating together and multiple mentions of "contact holders"... Even includes a mention of encountering another uboat and exchanging experiences.

Just because something isn't explicitly spelled out in the logs doesn't mean that isn't the way it was done.
If I'm giving an objective to take, I'm not going to sit there and break down what battle drill was performed to take the objective... It's common knowledge by those doing it.

[ramjbjb]

ok, please be as kind as to point to me, exactly where, on that KTB, is mentioned that U-96 radioed to any other uboat, or that any other uboat radioed U-96. Because all and every one of the messages mentioned in that report are from U-96 to BdU or from BdU to U-96.

Which perfectly backs what I'm repeatedly stating here, while clearly shows that what you talk about (mentioned on the handbook or not), is not what was done.

and no, "encountering another uboat and exchanging experiences" (which, btw, was doing with light signals, not radio), has absolutely nothing to do with what we're talking about. For crying out loud, Uboats wouldn't radio even milk cows, they would join them at instructed areas dictated by BdU, and all contact with them would be through light signals, or (when close enough) voice.

so I'm going to insist yet once again: Uboats on the Atlantic did not coordinate with other submarines using the radio. All coordination was done by the centralized command of BdU, all signals from Uboats were directed at BdU. No boats radioed any others. And convoy attacks were free for alls with no coordination at all since the moment BdU gave the signal to begin the attack.

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Originally posted by ramjbjb:

ok, please be as kind as to point to me, exactly where, on that KTB, is mentioned that U-96 radioed to any other uboat, or that any other uboat radioed U-96. Because all and every one of the messages mentioned in that report are from U-96 to BdU or from BdU to U-96.

and no, "encountering another uboat and exchanging experiences" (which, btw, was doing with light signals, not radio), has absolutely nothing to do with what we're talking about.

So try again.

I love how you believe that something in a then current military handbook explaining how things are done is optional... Tell me you've never been in the military without telling me you've never been in the military.

[ramjbjb]

Originally posted by XIIIOpsec:

I love how you believe that something in a current military handbook explaining how things are done is optional... Tell me you've never been in the military without telling me you've never been in the military.

I love how I repeatedly asked from you to bring evidence of operational behavior that differed in any way from what I described, and all you brought as "proof" was a KTB underlining exactly what I explained.

As for the handbook and "me believing that something in a current military handbook, etc etc, is optional"... I mean. you brought a KTB here describing every and each of the radio messages sent by U-96 during a whole patrol.

If that handbook was to be followed, then Lehman-Willenbrock "Never was in the military without telling you he was never in the military". Because he damn never did anything close (nor even resembling to) what that handbook says should be done.

Then again, neither did any U-boat Kaleun since June of 1940 (and the ones who did before it were the exception and not the norm)

Dude, you brought proof that what you're talking is nonsense, and you still keep on insisting on it, based on a handbook dated 1942 that describes practices abandoned already in the early months of 1940 after the utter failures of wolfpacks Hartmann and Rösing.

So I'll insist once more. Bring me proof that U-boats coordinated with each other using radio signals between them after mid-1940. Just one instance. Not a handbook, ACTUAL PRACTICE.

If as you said, that handbook was the bible, there'll be plenty of evidence, after all. Right?.

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https://steamcommunity.com/sharedfiles/filedetails/?id=3298066710

A boat reported bearings
Radio message from Air
Stood by for bearing signals
Radio message from U 98

That's just one page... What you already claimed you read over and every message was from BDU

[ramjbjb]

Sighting reports from U-boats were directed at BdU, but listened to, and decripted by, every Uboats around.

You already have that in the game. Reports of sightings and contacts by other Uboats around are heard by your radioman all the time.

Radio messages from air contacts were sent by BdU. Not from the patrolling planes. if anything because Luftwaffe and Ubootwaffe didn't cooperate at all on the operational areas, those reports were passed (when luftwaffe felt like it, which wasn't exactly the norm) from the luftwaffe HQs in france to BdU in Lorient first, then Berlin. Then BdU sent the corresponding information to the Uboats involved in the area.

And no, that's not proof of what you're saying. Those reports were not communication between Uboats. Were communications between Uboats and BdU and from BdU to Uboats.

Please bring the proof I asked for, not whatever you think it is.

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Originally posted by ramjbjb:

Sighting reports from U-boats were directed at BdU, but listened to, and decripted by, every Uboats around.

You already have that in the game.

And no, that's not proof of what you're saying. Those reports were not communication between Uboats. Were communications between Uboats and BdU.

Please bring the proof I asked for, not whatever you think it is.

It's a radio signal, as long as you're monitoring the radio and you're in distance you can hear it, that's the reason why you can pick up SOS signals, and signals from enemy escorts after they spot you.

What type of radio signal do you think is easier to intercept, a low power signal for nearby subs or a high power signal all the way back to France...?