Wolfpacks & ASW

[Thick Boy]

So I've been playing this game for a while and always wondered wether it would be viable ideia to implement a wolfpack system.

So far the experience has been great, going in solo missions against a Large Convoy and picking each ship one by one, pushing the sub capabilities to endure big depths while being hunted by destroyers....

However, sometimes I feel it would lot more immersive if we could coordinate or help allies in combat, not just mine allied Uboats which are out of action. With this we would have perhaps more consideration in some atacks that we perform, but at the same time it would certainly make atacks on "bigger convoys" more interesting and engaging.

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The other topic is ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare)

So far i've only been atacked with depth charges and I know historically there were some other devices like the hedgehog

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What are your opinions on these guys? Would these change the gameplay to much? Are these concepts even in consideration of the developers?

[El Rushbo]

I don't know if they've been modeled in the game yet but if the hedgehog is in the game you won't see it in action until 1942.

As far as wolf packs are concerned I would love to see that implemented in the game. Realistically a U-boat would be instructed to stay in contact with a convoy and update its positions while others are called in for an attack. The downside is that wolf pack tactics rely heavily on radio communications for coordination meaning Allied direction finding can easily pick it up. Even if the messages are still encrypted they'll still get the idea that someone's out there. (Allied code-breaking was actually very good during the war)

[MrCanoeHead]

Basically convoy battles

[chksix]

They used signal lamps when in visual range of eachother.

[El Rushbo]

Wouldn't that be risky at night as escorts would be able to see them? I know on at least one occasion a U-boat spotted a convoy miles away only because someone lit a cigarette on deck.

[Peregrine]

Originally posted by El Rushbo:

Wouldn't that be risky at night as escorts would be able to see them? I know on at least one occasion a U-boat spotted a convoy miles away only because someone lit a cigarette on deck.

A lot more often than that. US Subs and others as well used that or a quick flashlight strobe to aim at throughout the war.

a single cig doomed several ships, and why blackout was so strictly enforced.

[wolf310ii]

Originally posted by chksix:

They used signal lamps when in visual range of eachother.

In wolfpacks, they dont come in visual range of each other, also the u-boats dont comunicate with each other. One u-boat send the position of the convoy to the BdU and the BdU send these infos and orders to the other boats

[Peregrine]

Originally posted by wolf310ii:

Originally posted by chksix:

They used signal lamps when in visual range of eachother.

In wolfpacks, they dont come in visual range of each other, also the u-boats dont comunicate with each other. One u-boat send the position of the convoy to the BdU and the BdU send these infos and orders to the other boats

They did coordinate attacks, somewhat. But in general, they were a lot less effective than the USN Wolfpacks were.

[El Rushbo]

Originally posted by Peregrine:

They did coordinate attacks, somewhat. But in general, they were a lot less effective than the USN Wolfpacks were.

That's kind of a difficult comparison because you're talking about two completely different theaters. Plus US subs rarely worked in wolf packs and the few times they did it was only around three to six. The Japanese did not adopt the same convoy system used in the Atlantic, they never really grasped the concept of unrestricted submarine warfare which is why the US Navy succeeded against Japan where the Kriegsmarine failed against the Allies.

[Peregrine]

Originally posted by El Rushbo:

Originally posted by Peregrine:

They did coordinate attacks, somewhat. But in general, they were a lot less effective than the USN Wolfpacks were.

That's kind of a difficult comparison because you're talking about two completely different theaters. Plus US subs rarely worked in wolf packs and the few times they did it was only around three to six. The Japanese did not adopt the same convoy system used in the Atlantic, they never really grasped the concept of unrestricted submarine warfare which is why the US Navy succeeded against Japan where the Kriegsmarine failed against the Allies.

I see your point.

USN Subs DID use wolfpacks a lot. Though, it did depend also on who's command they fell under. SWP (ANZAC area) Boats did tend to operate alone, though they less frequently operated in small units.

Boats out of Central Pac (Pearl and Midway) however favored 3-6 boat units, with COC established ashore before the patrol and they were successfully used throughout the war.

German Uboats would sometimes organize like this, but mostly it was a boat makes contact, radioed it in, and the others are micromanged by BdU and ordered in to bring in maximum pressure, but this was mixed result, and many boats were lost.

Japan used individual patrols, and some "Picket Lines" which acted a lot like German Uboat Packs in that one boat would detect and the others would try to attack. One such line made the Destroyer Escort USS England famous for sinking 5 of her 6 Subs in 12 days.

Side note, the Japanese shipping capabilities were among the best in the world at the start of the conflict, and while large convoys did happen, they weren't as organized as the US and Allies were in WWI and II.

[El Rushbo]

Two problems with the Japanese during the war though: Their shipping wasn't as efficient as they would send a freighter carrying cargo in one direction, but when they sent it back it was carrying ballast rather than a different type of cargo. They weren't as refined in their methods.

Their other problem was as I mentioned above how they didn't really grasp the concept of unrestricted submarine warfare. Their submarines were used for reconnaissance and attacking warships. Later they were used for cargo as it was a safer method to reach increasingly isolated bases. While the US set up a very solid logistics system in the Pacific, it wasn't very well protected. The Japanese missed an opportunity to cause serious damage to the US war effort. It probably wouldn't have changed the outcome of the war, but it would have made the US campaign far more difficult.

[Peregrine]

Originally posted by El Rushbo:

Two problems with the Japanese during the war though: Their shipping wasn't as efficient as they would send a freighter carrying cargo in one direction, but when they sent it back it was carrying ballast rather than a different type of cargo. They weren't as refined in their methods.

Their other problem was as I mentioned above how they didn't really grasp the concept of unrestricted submarine warfare. Their submarines were used for reconnaissance and attacking warships. Later they were used for cargo as it was a safer method to reach increasingly isolated bases. While the US set up a very solid logistics system in the Pacific, it wasn't very well protected. The Japanese missed an opportunity to cause serious damage to the US war effort. It probably wouldn't have changed the outcome of the war, but it would have made the US campaign far more difficult.

It was decently protected, though we did focus the Carriers rather than the transports.

Also, yes, knew about the Sub Transports, we also had a few cargo subs, as did the Germans.

Agree, the Japanese could have made better use of ships and subs, but good thing they didn't.

One point on the Cargo to Ballast, they might not have had anything to ship back, and or, the ship in question might not have been able to handle said cargo. For example, the last 4 Fubuki Class Destroyers (Type III) also were often used as transports, and towed supplies and fuel barrels behind them. While they're useful to get troops and supplies "Quickly" to their destination, they're not quite equipped to bring a large quantity of goods with them on the return trip.

[ждун]

Actually it is implemented in certain degree.

How was it in reality?

German submarine command (BdU) combined wulf packs and assigned to each of its members a certain areas to patrol so that the distance between each wulf pack member was about 100-200 kilometers. They planned the areas so that it was like a net spanned at known convoi routes. During their patrols they were most of the time on their own. When one of the boats discovered a convoi, it was not instantly attacking it, instead it was following the convoi at save distance reporting periodically its position to BdU. The BdU broadcastet it to all wulfpack members and pulled them all together to coordinate the attack. When the attack began (usually at night) each of the boats was operating on their own. They did not coordinate between each other, and were not necessarily attacking at same time. A wulf pack attack could last through entire night, and that was also part of the tactics. The idea was to put the escorts under constant stress over many hours so the escorts were forced to save on ordnance and use it wisely.

In UBOAT you can consider yourself as a part of a wulf pack. When youre on patrol youre getting those missions over radio where you have to intercept convois. So consider that one of your pack members spottet it and bdu is now coordinating a wulf pack attack providing you necessary information.

What is different?

1. In reality patrol areas were much smaller. About 200x200 km. In UBOAt your patrol area is about 100 times larger. This gives you more freedom to roam around searching for random contacts, in reality pack members used to stay in much smaller area, therefore finding less random targets.

2. You cannot become the spotter yourself. So getting the task just to follow the convoi and report its position over one or two days.

3. you don't notice the action of other pack members. Like suddenly exploding ships, or escorts searching for other boats somewere.

[El Rushbo]

That would be a cool feature to have. As far as the size of your patrol grid, I imagine it would be variable depending on how many boats were in the Atlantic at the time. Donitz's plan ultimately revolved around having 300 U-boats in order to close the Atlantic using them as a net. Problem was that number wasn't achieved until early 1943. For the first few months it seemed to be working, then that's when the tide shifted.