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The keys with the Axis (and I am not a particularly competent German player) is to go for encirclements while keeping the MP in your Pzr/Mot divisions as high as poss - so if you push them to the limit by T3, it'll be T5 by the time you recover (ie overall you have less capacity than a more moderate approach). Think about force allocation, many players detach 1 Pzr Corps from AGC to AGN and a second to AGS, the reason is its ok with AGC to end the summer more or less historically but you need Leningrad (or the front just gets too long) and a deep penetration in the Ukraine (resources).
Rinse, repeat.
EDIT:
Not when they are 100km deep about all the way and all in at least level 2 forts, however few scarce CVs each individual formation had. Not without some significant buildup of force at least.
1. At the beginning of Barbarossa, German Heere had 279,000 trained reservists in the ready replacement pool. In the campaign (without editing) the German player has 0 trained replacements (ground elements - squads) in the pool.
2. Soviet organizational capability is impossibly proficient at reorganizing, mustering and deploying new forces by turn 3. The Reds never experience disorganization after the initial Axis attack. Throughout 1941, Stalin could never decide whether to counterattack, die in place or retreat to better defensive lines until after the disasters at Kiev in Sept 41, and Kharkov in June 4,2 when he finally started paying serious attention to his generals' advice and after-action lessons learned. Despite its well-earned rep for patriotism, heroic courage and endurance, the Red Army was less proficient and skilled in command and organization of forces in 1945 than the WITE Soviet player in July 41 - when a despondent Stalin was hiding from the politburo in his private dacha. Soviet administrative expertise needs to be gradually improved from worse than terrible in 1941 to fairly capable by 1943 when they prepared Kursk defenses after studying German defenses that kept the Red Army at bay in the Rzhev saliant until its evacuation in Spring 1943.