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As to the Scion's photos, I agree with your points even if they didn't bother me. I suppose there is a thematical reason for the "Garden of Eden" party to be as it was. Personally I like having the photos there as they were a great jumping off point for figuring out the Scion's Daemon, but also could help point towards his identity in a loose way (cross-referencing with article from Laborer). But all of the above could still mostly work with their clothes on, probably
In terms of the final puzzle my intention is that there were a couple of different hints to the Adjudicator's identity and that players would come to a conclusion by cross referencing a couple. As for why the Adjudicator's personas where not anagrams of their actual name, 1 reason is as TNTDragons has said to avoid people solving the answer too early, but another is because Aristotle's name is too short to anagram into enough convincing names for all the identities the Adjudicator takes on during the game.
As for the Garden of Eden photos my intention behind those is tied into what I personally feel is the fundamental flaw of Virtue Ethics. I believe that if your system of morality is built around following the example of people that you respect, then your sense of what is right is entirely dictated by the norms of the society in which you live. In the photos of the party you can see that The Scion is encouraged to party by their friend, so to them participation in the garden of Eden party is moral because it is permitted by their moral exemplar. Likewise in the essay they mention that a drug addict is less worthy of compassion, which they believe because their father is the head of the F.B.I during the height of the war on drugs. Likewise Aristotle believes some form of slavery is necessary because it was ubiquitous during his time.
The placement of the essay together with the garden of Eden photos on the first day is intentional to highlight the Scions hypocrisy, despite the moral grandstanding of the essay The Scions is as corruptible as anyone. I was aiming for almost like a 'politician preaches family values while cheating on his spouse' type energy, without it being something so bad that the Scion became entirely unsympathetic.
Furthermore it's not just that the pressure from his Father means that the Scion had no time to hang out with friends, its that because of his father's position he can't do anything that would damage his family's reputation. The daemon ability gave Scion the license to do something scandalous because he believed he could just undo it, and any incriminating evidence (like the photos of the party) would simply cease to exist.
I'm not necessarily intending to change your mind with this giant wall of text, people have different opinions about what's appropriate and that's ok, just thought I'd explain my reasoning behind the choices that I've made.
After 6-th day, the two body makes me they could be duplicated or copied by demon power, but still does not.
These tricks make me fun when I got final answer.
That doesn't follow. The unstated assumption is everyone you respect follows the norms of the society in which you live.
That is peer pressure. 'Respects a school drinking buddy more then his successful father' is...
odd.
'For he who can foresee with his mind is by nature intended to be lord and master, and he who can work with his body is a subject, and by nature a slave ; hence master and slave have the same interest'
'Hence we see what is the nature and office of a slave ; he who is by nature not his own but another's and yet a man, is by nature a slave ; and he may be said to belong to another who, being a human being, is also a possession. And a ..possession may be defined as an instrument of action, separable from the possessor.' (Politics, Book 1)
My contention is that would be true the majority of the time, and any circumstance in which it isn't true is not because of the example of a moral exemplar.
For something to be a norm of a society it has to be something the majority of that society find acceptable, therefore the people most respected in a society are those that are most closely aligned with that society's values.
For someone to respect a moral exemplar who has values that run contrary to the norms of the society they live in they would have to already hold similar values, otherwise why would they respect them? In which case they respect the moral exemplar because they have those values, they don't hold those values because of the moral exemplar. If a moral exemplar is capable of doing something so immoral that they cease to be your moral exemplar, then doesn't it follow that your moral philosophy is based on some internal calculation that you are making, and thus you don't need a moral exemplar to inform moral decisions.
I'm merely suggesting that it's driven by context. Ultimately The Scion agrees with his father's beliefs about law and order, but given that his father's instructions are only to not do anything that would reflect badly on their family, if The Scion believes that he can act without consequences due to his power then he can follow his father's wishes while also conforming to the expectations of his environment.
Aristotle didn't independently derive the idea of slavery in a vacuum, this is his intellectual rationalization of a practice that is already commonplace in his society. And this extends to many of his writings, if we were to take for example Aristotle's natural philosophy, he observes that there are phenomena that can't be explained by the four classical elements, and to resolve that discrepancy he adds a fifth element aether to make system more logically coherent. But logical coherence does not equal truth. Aristotle has a remarkable ability to explain his reasoning for why things are, but he's limited by both what he's able to observe, and frameworks that he's building on.
The distinction between those that plan and those that execute may have been beneficial to the Greek city state (though I doubt the slaves would agree that it necessitated the restriction of their freedom), but in many nomadic societies those distinctions aren't present. But Aristotle of course sees them as fundamental because that's the environment that he has observed, and to him the Greek city state is the most advanced kind of human society.
Christianity and Buddhism both pulled that off.
As for 'doing something immoral', Aristotle's philosophy is mostly about knowledge. To much concern for danger is cowardice. Too little concern for danger is recklessness. What is the right amount of courage? 'X is bad in a certain way' doesn't impact learning other virtues.
Or to put it another way, virtues are means to an end and empiricism (looking at what other people have done) is the best way to discover how to best meet that end.
In that case what Aristotelian virtue is he violating?
"For he who can be, and therefore is another's, and he who participates in reason enough to apprehend, but not to have, reason, is a slave by nature. Whereas the lower animals cannot even apprehend reason ; they obey their instincts. And indeed the use made of slaves and of tame animals is not very different ; for both with their bodies minister to the needs of life. Nature would like to distinguish between the bodies of freemen and slaves, making the one strong for servile labour, the other upright, and although useless for such services, useful for political life in the arts both of war and peace. But this does not hold universally : for some slaves have the souls and others have the bodies of freemen. And doubtless if men differed from one another in the mere forms of their bodies as much as the statues of the Gods do from men, all would acknowledge that the inferior class should be slaves of the superior. And if there is a difference in the body, how much more in the soul ! But the beauty of the a body is seen, whereas the beauty of the soul is not seen. It is clear, then, that some men are by nature free, and others slaves, and that for these latter slavery is both expedient and right.
But that those who take the opposite view have in a certain way right on their side, may be easily seen. For the words slavery and slave are used in two senses. There is a slave or slavery by law as well as by nature. The law of which I speak is a sort of convention, according to which whatever is taken in war is supposed to belong to the victors. But this right many jurists impeach, as they would an orator who brought forward an unconstitutional measure : they detest the notion that, because one man has the power of doing violence and is superior in brute strength, another shall be his slave and subject. Even among philosophers there is a difference of opinion. The origin of the dispute, and the reason why the arguments cross, is as follows : Virtue, when furnished with means, may be deemed to have the greatest power of doing violence : and as superior power is only found where there is superior excellence of some kind, power is thought to imply virtue. But does it likewise imply justice ? — that is the question. And, in order to make a distinction between them, some assert that justice is benevolence : to which others reply that justice is nothing more than the rule of a superior. If the two views are regarded as antagonistic and exclusive [i. e. if the notion that justice is benevolence excludes the idea of a just rule of a superior], the alternative [viz. that no one should rule over others has no force or plausibility, because it implies that not even the superior in virtue ought to rule, or be master. Some, clinging, as they think, to a principle of justice (for law and custom are a sort of justice), assume that slavery in war is justified by law, but they are not consistent. For what if the cause of the war be unjust ? No one would ever say that he is a slave who is unworthy to be a slave. Were this the case, men of the highest rank would be slaves and the children of slaves if they or their parents chance to have been taken captive and sold. Wherefore Hellenes do not like to call themselves slaves, but confine the term to barbarians. Yet, in using this language, they really mean the natural slave of whom we spoke at first ; for it must be admitted that some are slaves everywhere, others nowhere."
pg 34, Politics
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This section isn't meant to justify slavery- it is to establish definitions he uses for his metaphor about different types of government. Aristotle says some people were natural slaves but implicitly rejects the idea that that conquest justifies enslaving people (especially Greek people).
Aristotle was a Macedonian, trained in Athens who became tutor to Alexander the Great. 'Please don't enslave my colleges' is a better reading of the subtext.