Some Reflections on Shattered Sword

[Dolokhov]

A more critical reading of the Midway history left me with questions, and I wondered if your perspective would provide further insight.

One of the first observations about Kido Butai at Midway is that the carrier air groups were understrength, perhaps because the Japanese were short of aircraft, either due to production complications or the expansion of the perimeter. The comparison is to the Pearl Harbor aircraft complements though- is this reasonable? I could understand the Japanese taking every aircraft possible to Pearl, yet these numbers not being viable for normal operations?

I've not found any information on carrier ordnance, I am aware that WW2 battleships would typically carry only enough ammunition for a single prolonged engagement, were the carriers similarly limited? How many strikes on Midway was Kido Butai capable of?

Shattered Sword is very dubious about the ability of the Japanese to invade Midway, and makes much of the effect on the timetable of the need to attack at high tide to be able to cross the reef. If the entire operation would have to be delayed a month if the invasion was not on time to the day, was it very vulnerable to the weather?

The Japanese had two objectives at Midway, the invasion and then the defeat of American naval assets. While it is often repeated that the United States woke after Pearl, after the Two Ocean Act they had already committed to an expansion of the USN by five fleet carriers and eight battleships, which the Japanese could not match. Midway itself could not be sustained as a Japanese outpost, though obviously Yamamoto could not get authorisation for an unsuccessful invasion just to draw the USN out, especially if he needed Army forces which would be embarrassed. Were there hidden priorities?

You've mentioned nikuhaku hitchu before as a reason for the Japanese admirals to close the range at Midway, despite this not affecting their weapons delivery and being counterproductive in that their better organised launches and longed ranged aircraft would be more suited to attack from greater distance. Yet was this just a reaction to the semi-disgrace of Takagi after Coral Sea? It is significant to the Japanese AI whether this doctrine is regarded as an absolute imperative for all Japanese admirals, or merely a historically conditional one dependent on the aftermath of Coral Sea?

The SBD carried either a 500lb bomb or a 1000lb bomb, what were the consequences, Shattered Sword doesn't mention any dramatic impact on range? If Kido Butai turned west at Midway is there a point at which the more heavily loaded SBD's are no longer a factor? The Japanese were peculiarly vulnerable to the SBD given that they specialised in defence against torpedo bombers? The demise of Kido Butai was ascribed peculiarly to the presence of loaded and fuelled aircraft in the hangars, though this could hardly apply to Hiryu. Also Japanese damage control is claimed to be deficient. Yet Hiryu and Soryu were cruiser-based very lightly built ships, while Akagi and Kaga were old. Another older carrier, Lexington, also found fires difficult to control and blew up. Both the Yorktowns and Shokakus were more resistant to damage?

The USN at Midway did not have to make critical decisions, they knew where the Japanese were and just had to launch at them. Yet advanced knowledge of the Japanese operation isn't the only factor? What if the Japanese used an advanced battleship contingent for bombardment, or an advanced light carrier? For surprise to be effective it depended on the Japanese leading with their most vital assets? How will TFA deal with this in Japanese planning and OOB variations, does taking alternative approaches include these options?

[Dolokhov]

I wonder whether at historical Midway the player will get much more to do than launch aircraft at the target? With the large force of PBYs at Midway and the absence of other forces in the vicinity the most famous of the engagements lacks for critical decision points on the USN side?

Of the 1942 battles, is Midway the only one where the Japanese carrier force has no other friendly force between it and the enemy? It doesn't become official doctrine that the cover force should precede the carriers until after Midway- and at Coral Sea the invasion force only absorbs the first strike because it is detected first.

[Drydock Dreams Games]

Originally posted by Dolokhov:

A more critical reading of the Midway history left me with questions, and I wondered if your perspective would provide further insight.

One of the first observations about Kido Butai at Midway is that the carrier air groups were understrength, perhaps because the Japanese were short of aircraft, either due to production complications or the expansion of the perimeter. The comparison is to the Pearl Harbor aircraft complements though- is this reasonable? I could understand the Japanese taking every aircraft possible to Pearl, yet these numbers not being viable for normal operations?

Not sure I get the question ^^
Numbers were limited, but this was everything they had on hand.

I've not found any information on carrier ordnance, I am aware that WW2 battleships would typically carry only enough ammunition for a single prolonged engagement, were the carriers similarly limited? How many strikes on Midway was Kido Butai capable of?

I have that somewhere, but my memory is that reserves would usually allow for a couple strikes, pretty much like aboard US carriers. If I am not mistaken, numbers available in War in the Pacific: Admiral Edition are accurate.

Shattered Sword is very dubious about the ability of the Japanese to invade Midway, and makes much of the effect on the timetable of the need to attack at high tide to be able to cross the reef. If the entire operation would have to be delayed a month if the invasion was not on time to the day, was it very vulnerable to the weather?

Not sure it factors in very much. The Japanese were not in doubt in regard of their ability to take Midway, as such delaying wasn't much of a requirement. Moreover, timing for the upcoming operations in the South Pacific has been decided on by then, and waiting for another month would have made this planning obsolete. High tide or not, chances of a successful landing were apparently low anyway.

The Japanese had two objectives at Midway, the invasion and then the defeat of American naval assets. While it is often repeated that the United States woke after Pearl, after the Two Ocean Act they had already committed to an expansion of the USN by five fleet carriers and eight battleships, which the Japanese could not match. Midway itself could not be sustained as a Japanese outpost, though obviously Yamamoto could not get authorisation for an unsuccessful invasion just to draw the USN out, especially if he needed Army forces which would be embarrassed. Were there hidden priorities?

Midway was certainly sustainable as an outpost, pretty much like Wake was, at least in theory. In practice, it would have started quickly to be used as a convenient training ground for AAF heavy bombers rotating through the Hawaiian bases.

You've mentioned nikuhaku hitchu before as a reason for the Japanese admirals to close the range at Midway, despite this not affecting their weapons delivery and being counterproductive in that their better organised launches and longed ranged aircraft would be more suited to attack from greater distance. Yet was this just a reaction to the semi-disgrace of Takagi after Coral Sea? It is significant to the Japanese AI whether this doctrine is regarded as an absolute imperative for all Japanese admirals, or merely a historically conditional one dependent on the aftermath of Coral Sea?

Admiral Yamaguchi was deemed to be one of the most aggressive commanders out there. That's probably the main motivation to begin with.

The USN at Midway did not have to make critical decisions, they knew where the Japanese were and just had to launch at them. Yet advanced knowledge of the Japanese operation isn't the only factor? What if the Japanese used an advanced battleship contingent for bombardment, or an advanced light carrier? For surprise to be effective it depended on the Japanese leading with their most vital assets? How will TFA deal with this in Japanese planning and OOB variations, does taking alternative approaches include these options?

There was no alternative really. The invasion force was spotted early, at a point it should not have necessarily, had the US been left in the dark regarding the plan. The prior knowledge of the operation was the main factor. Vanguards like the ones used in the battles in the Solomon later were developed following the debacle at Midway, not independently from it, from what I understand.

Cheers!

[Drydock Dreams Games]

Originally posted by Dolokhov:

I wonder whether at historical Midway the player will get much more to do than launch aircraft at the target? With the large force of PBYs at Midway and the absence of other forces in the vicinity the most famous of the engagements lacks for critical decision points on the USN side?

Of the 1942 battles, is Midway the only one where the Japanese carrier force has no other friendly force between it and the enemy? It doesn't become official doctrine that the cover force should precede the carriers until after Midway- and at Coral Sea the invasion force only absorbs the first strike because it is detected first.

I would carefully guard against making assumptions of the kind as far as the game is concerned. I encourage you to play it first and then make your mind in regard of its inherent replayability.

Midway in particular is the example of a very well though preplanning getting utterly ruined by poor execution on the USN's part. Launching late, or early, or getting discovered will radically alter your options even in a Midway-like environment.

Hopefully we will manage to reflect just that.

[Dolokhov]

I don't expect replayability to be an issue, and it can hardly depend on a single scenario, historical Midway? However Midway is the only plausible 'decisive battle' and it is instructive to produce alternate versions? It just seems that the Japanese plan is peculiarly prone to ambush, and that it is possible- even given the USN intelligence- to produce a far less tempting prospect.

The Japanese had another prewar naval principle shuchu dai enkyori shageki 'very long range concentrated fire,' designed to conserve precious Japanese major assets by only exposing them to enemy units at the very limit of their capacity. The superbattleships were designed with this in mind, as were the carrier aircraft and even the surface torpedoes. They had even devised the role of 'scout carrier'. Pearl Harbor seems to have skewed all their sorties up to Midway in favour of base raids, which aren't a part of their prewar planning?

Yet have they got a senior admiral in 1941-2 who could be a potential commander of kido butai and would base his battle tactics on the Japanese range advantage? Or even without the influence of Pearl Harbor is there a disconnect in the IJN between what the ships were designed for and how the admirals wished to use them?

[Gaspote]

Originally posted by Dolokhov:

One of the first observations about Kido Butai at Midway is that the carrier air groups were understrength, perhaps because the Japanese were short of aircraft, either due to production complications or the expansion of the perimeter. The comparison is to the Pearl Harbor aircraft complements though- is this reasonable? I could understand the Japanese taking every aircraft possible to Pearl, yet these numbers not being viable for normal operations?

Battle of Coral Sea results prior to midway was Yorktown damaged and Lexington sunk.
Shoho CVL sunk, Shokaku damaged and Zuikaku air group being understrength/

Yorktown was repaired to participate in Midway meanwhile they never allow Shokaku air group to go on Zuikaku which result in 2 of the best carriers Japan had not being used. They both carried the most aircraft and some of the best air group. Shokaku could have give air group to replenish Zuikaku but it wasn't done.

Coral sea battle is often cited as a tactical japanese victory and a strategic loss for this very reason.

[Dolokhov]

Shattered Sword claims that the Japanese had been very short of carrier aircraft in 1941 and had produced scarcely any since. The entire fleet had provided extra aircraft to Kido Butai for Pearl Harbor to fill out the carriers. At Midway Akagi is reported as having a complement of 54 aircraft, the same number as the smaller Soryu and Hiryu. There had been large numbers of spares on all four carriers to replace lost or temporarily damaged aircraft, by Midway these no longer seem to have been on board.

The observation refers to the individual aircraft complements of the four carriers at Midway and not to the effect of the two missing carriers following Coral Sea. It is less clear why the rest of the fleet should have provided extra aircraft for Pearl Harbor and not Midway though?

[Gaspote]

Originally posted by Dolokhov:

Shattered Sword claims that the Japanese had been very short of carrier aircraft in 1941 and had produced scarcely any since. The entire fleet had provided extra aircraft to Kido Butai for Pearl Harbor to fill out the carriers. At Midway Akagi is reported as having a complement of 54 aircraft, the same number as the smaller Soryu and Hiryu. There had been large numbers of spares on all four carriers to replace lost or temporarily damaged aircraft, by Midway these no longer seem to have been on board.

The observation refers to the individual aircraft complements of the four carriers at Midway and not to the effect of the two missing carriers following Coral Sea. It is less clear why the rest of the fleet should have provided extra aircraft for Pearl Harbor and not Midway though?

My bad then altough a beginning of explanation is that, carriers air group seems not to shared ressources. Shokaku air groups weren't use to fill Zuikaku for this reason and both carriers air groups could have been used to fill Midway carriers but they weren't.

I believe japanese doctrine wasn't to share ressources between carriers and affected group stay in the carriers no matter what.

[Bramborough]

Originally posted by Dolokhov:

Yet have they got a senior admiral in 1941-2 who could be a potential commander of kido butai and would base his battle tactics on the Japanese range advantage? Or even without the influence of Pearl Harbor is there a disconnect in the IJN between what the ships were designed for and how the admirals wished to use them?

Jisaburo Ozawa comes to mind. He wasn't as senior as Nagumo, but I think was senior enough that he could have been a viable choice had Yamamoto wanted to do so.

========

As to the larger topic, I think there's plenty of scope for substantive US operational and tactical decision points. The intelligence was obviously crucial, but in the end simply offered the opportunity to have US carriers present in the first place, and a chance - not a certainty - for ambush. But then the battle still has to actually be fought. There was absolutely no guarantee that TF 16/17 would be able to achieve the lopsided 4:1 carrier exchange, or for that matter even to necessarily get away with a more even-handed ratio.

What happens if McClusky makes a different choice at that critical moment when the ENT dive bombers reach their planned intercept point and find only empty ocean? Or if he doesn't soon afterward spot that destroyer which points him toward the Kido Butai?

Or what happens if the Japanese morning search indeed spots one or both of the US task forces (and clearly communicate such back to Nagumo with reasonably prompt, complete, and accurate info) earlier than they actually did?

Another factor I'm interested in how TFA might handle: HORNET's Flight to Nowhere. In order to replicate something like that, would require a mechanic whereby one's subordinate carriers might disregard the player's orders and deliberately launch their entire group on a different bearing from the one designated. Which is what happened...yet oh my goodness that would be maddeningly frustrating gameplay, lol.

[Dolokhov]

If your strikes have a greater chance to miss their intercept points at longer range then you might identify Spruance's decision to launch early as critical, though if the player knows that the Japanese will close the range to detected USN carriers anyway it makes that decision easier? Yes, if luck goes against the USN then the player will be far more involved, though with three full strikes aimed at a target also engaged with constant land-based strikes and poor at direct fire against divebombing attacks, it seems possible that the luck factor was not as favourable to the USN as it is often claimed to be.

While the USN have a radar and AA advantage to defend strikes, its also not often highlighted that the Japanese could activate a homing beacon on their search planes to guide their strikes. Japanese search schemes are subject to much criticism, yet in 1942 this is potentially decisive?

I'm not questioning the replayability of the historical Midway scenario. However, it does seem much more replayable if you allow the Japanese plan to vary? While the intelligence was crucial to allow the ambush to take place, the Japanese plan is also a critical factor, leading with the strike force and with no other task forces anywhere near it. You could also question the USN plan to have nothing except carrier forces?